

Greater Wellington Regional Council / Transit New Zealand

Proposed Western CORRIDOR PLAN

Hearing Sub-committee's Report

8 March 2006




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
Members of the Greater Wellington Regional Council and its Regional Land Transport Committee;
and the Chairperson and Members of the Board of Transit New Zealand.

We are pleased to present our Report as requested in the Terms of Reference to guide our work
as adopted by the Regional Land Transport Committee on 6 October 2005.

Dated: 8 March 2006




Terry McDavitt (Chair)




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Glossary of Terms

Term	Explanation
Affected communities	In relation to a proposed activity, means a group of people who are affected by the proposed activity because of living, studying, or working in close geographical proximity to the proposed activity [ref: Section 5, Interpretation, Land Transport Management Act 2003]
ATMS	Automated Traffic Management Systems
Batter	A slope, as of the outer face of a wall, that recedes from bottom to top
BCR	Benefit/cost ratio
Coastal Expressway	The proposed upgrade of SH1 Centennial Highway from Pukerua Bay to Paekakariki
Coastal Incremental Upgrade	Staged upgrade of portions of the Coastal Route involving Pukerua Bay Bypass, Paekakariki Interchange , Coastal Expressway, Existing Mana section possibly converted to 4 lane expressway.
Coastal Route	Progressive 4-laning and upgrading of the section of SH1 from Ngauranga to Peka Peka along the existing alignment (all elements of the proposed WCP)
Coastal Route Upgrade	Upgrade of portions of the Coastal Route to a 4 lane Expressway involving Pukerua Bay Bypass, Paekakariki Interchange , Coastal Expressway, and the Mana Bypass.
Community Survey	DMB Research Public Opinion Survey, February 2006
Cross-Valley Connector	Proposed road linking the west and east sides of the southern Hutt Valley – See map for approximate location
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
Grays Road Upgrade	See map for approximate location
GW	Greater Wellington, the Regional Council (also GWRC or GWC)
HCC	Hutt City Council
HOV lane	High Occupancy Vehicle Lane
Hutt Corridor Study	Study investigating transport requirements along the corridor from Upper Hutt to Ngauranga Interchange
Kapiti Western Link Road	See map for approximate location
KCDC	Kapiti Coast District Council
Land Transport NZ	Land Transport New Zealand
LGA	Local Government Act 2002
LTA	Land Transport Act 1998
LTMA	Land Transport Management Act 2003
Mana Bypass	See map for approximate location
Modal shift	A significant change in land transport users' choice of means of transportation
NIMBY	An acronym for "Not in My Backyard" ie opposition based on personal self-interest

NLTP	National Land Transport Programme
Nodes	Settlement or concentration of development
Paekakariki Interchange	See map for approximate location
PBS	Planning Balance Sheet
PCC	Porirua City Council
Petone – Grenada Link Road	See map for approximate location
Project Team	GW/Transit WCP Project Team
Proposed Plan	The proposed WCP, as detailed in the Consultation Document
Pukerua Bay Bypass	See map for approximate location
Rat-running	A practice of motorists seeking to avoid congestion on an arterial route by using local roads which have a low status within the roading hierarchy.
RLTC	Regional Land Transport Committee
RLTS	Regional Land Transport Strategy
RMA	Resource Management Act 1991
SH1	State Highway One
TDM	Travel Demand Management
Technical Papers	Papers prepared as part of the WCTS
TGAG	TGM Transmission Gully Action Group
TGM	Transmission Gully Motorway
The Consenting Strategy	Transit’s strategy for obtaining resource consents for the Coastal Route Upgrade
The Proposal	The WCP as noted below
The Region	The Wellington region – the region administered by the Wellington Regional Council
The Report	This Report
The Sub-committee	Western Corridor Hearings Sub-committee
The Treasury review	A review by the Treasury of the costs of the Transmission Gully and Coastal Route packages
UHCC	Upper Hutt City Council
WCC	Wellington City Council
WCP	WCP The Proposed Western Corridor Plan as described in the Consultation Document
WCTS	Western Corridor Transport Study – the work of the Project Team which has been used to develop the WCP
West – East Connector	Proposed road to link between SH1 (Tawa/Grenada) and SH2 (Dowse Interchange)

1 Overview

- Introduction**
- 1.1 Greater Wellington (GW) and Transit New Zealand (Transit) appointed the Hearings Sub-committee to hear and report on the public's views on the proposed Western Corridor Plan (WCP) as well as consider, summarise and report on the other matters referred to in its Terms of Reference (Annex 4). The consultation process resulted in an unprecedented community response, with 6017 written submitters, 905 of whom wished to be heard. The Sub-committee considers these numbers, and the weight of well considered material the submitters presented in writing and orally as significant. The views of the affected communities, local authorities' representatives and stakeholders have been clearly expressed to, and heard by, the Sub-committee.
- 1.2 The Sub-committee has given particular attention to those views to enable it to identify in what manner (if any) the proposed WCP may need to be modified in order to meet the requirements of S.175 of the Land Transport Act 1998 (LTA) and the Regional Land Transport Committee (RLTC) in the context of likely funding availability. Those findings are designed to assist the RLTC to make strategic decisions about the final content of a WCP for inclusion in the Regional Land Transport Strategy (RLTS).
- 1.3 The Sub-committee's findings are based on a distillation of the views expressed during the consultation phase, our review of relevant technical reports and information presented to the Sub-committee and the provisions of S.175(2) of the LTA. The Sub-committee's findings are detailed in Chapters 3 and 4 of this report. A pathway forward is identified in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 provides a list of suggested amendments to the WCP and shows that those amendments can be made within the funding package identified for the proposed WCP of \$1,006,750,000 (GST exclusive) to 2016.
- 1.4 The Sub-committee found that the Western Corridor faces a series of serious reliability, resilience and congestion problems that are impacting negatively on the Region, and on the main arterial transport link between Auckland, the Capital, and the South Island. All modelling and the experience of affected communities suggest that those problems are likely to increase over the next 20 years even under conservative forecasts of population and economic growth. Commuters in the Region already show strong usage of public transport. Although further modal shift from private motor vehicles to public passenger transport is desirable, this, in itself, will not replace the need for substantial upgrade of the roading infrastructure in the Western Corridor.
- 1.5 Given that the proposed WCP will form a major element of the RLTS the Sub-committee has given careful consideration to the provisions of S.175(2) of the LTA (refer Annex 3). In particular, how the WCP will take into account economic development, safety and personal security, access and mobility, public health, environmental sustainability, funding likely to be available, effects on the environment, views of affected communities and land transport network providers, options, land transport modes, passenger transport and demand management. Whilst the Sub-committee's findings reflect the views of submitters on all these issues and expressed through the surveys, they are not based only on those views. The Sub-committee has also considered a wide range of technical and supplementary material providing detailed information on social, economic, environmental, cultural, technical and costing aspects of the issues, as set out in Annex 4.
- Suggested amendments to WCP**
- 1.6 A full and detailed list of the amendments to the proposed WCP is presented in Table 6 in section 5. The most significant amendments are listed below:
- Deletion of the proposed roading programme in the central section of the proposed WCP including:

- the Coastal Expressway
 - the Pukerua Bay Bypass
 - the Mana Bypass.
- Deletion of the Grays Road Upgrade.
 - Deletion of the Whitford Brown Interchange.
 - Replacement of the proposed Paekakariki Interchange with minor safety works.
 - Inclusion of the full 4-laned Transmission Gully Motorway (TGM) from Mackays Crossing in the North to Linden in the South as currently designated.
 - Further investigation of the appropriate response to the needs of SH58 and SH2 consequential to the construction of TGM.
 - Deferral of elements of the proposed Northern Expressway, and completion of minor safety works on this part of SH1 in the meantime.
 - Replacement of the current suggested alignment of the Petone-Grenada Link Road with a new alignment following further investigation and consultation with affected communities. The Sub-committee finds it is necessary to establish as a high priority an acceptable and effective west-east connector from SH1 (Tawa/Grenada) with the proposed SH2 Dowse Interchange and the Cross-Valley Connector road with Gracefield in the Hutt Valley.
- 1.7 In respect to the proposed Northern Expressway, the Sub-committee finds that the complete Expressway as proposed in the WCP is not required within the twenty year timeframe of the WCP given the pending construction of the Western Link Road in Kapiti. The Sub-committee finds that safety improvements at Otaihangā and Waikanae are required on this section of SH1 in the meantime.
- 1.8 Provided there is a clear commitment to the construction of TGM, the community has expressed a willingness to accept short-term disruption and congestion associated with minor safety works, which will have on-going benefit after TGM is opened and the character of the central section of the current road is changed. The Sub-committee finds that there is substantial community support for relatively minor safety works at Paekakariki and Pukerua Bay.
- 1.9 The Sub-committee finds that, in the longer term, the status of the current SH1 alignment from Mackays Crossing to Linden should be reduced to meeting local traffic needs and providing a scenic route in which lower speeds and traffic volumes will prevail after the opening of TGM. The new environment would facilitate safe cycling along the route.
- 1.10 The Sub-committee finds there is substantial support in the Region for improvements to passenger rail services. The Sub-committee finds that there is a need to develop a Regional rail strategy, and for GW to take active leadership in its preparation and implementation. The Sub-committee finds that more funding needs to be invested in double-tracking between Mackay's Crossing and the proposed Lindale Bus/Rail Interchange and, eventually, for electrification to Waikanae over the next 30 years. The Sub-committee finds that the immediate focus should be on improving the reliability, quality and capacity of the rail infrastructure rather than increasing the frequency of services.
- 1.11 The Sub-committee finds that should savings be available from major roading projects, that the RLTC should consider reallocating those savings into rail to allow acceleration of the electrification of rail to Waikanae.

- 1.12 There was an element of general support for the concepts of travel demand management (TDM) to encourage a higher modal shift to public passenger transport. Tolling, as a form of road pricing, could be used as a TDM technique.
- 1.13 The Sub-committee also noted that there was some support for tolling of TGM in the belief that this would provide substantial funds towards the cost of TGM. The Sub-committee finds that tolling is not necessary to fund construction of TGM under the package of amendments set out in this Report. In any event the net revenue from tolling as a means of providing funds for construction would be relatively small.
- 1.14 The funding allocations for the amendments to the proposed WCP are set out below in Table 1. The amended WCP that we suggest, and the timeframes for its implementation, which we set out in detail in Chapter 5, matches the funding that is identified in the proposed WCP Consultation document.

Table 1: Funding Plan for Amended WCP

	Estimated cost of 2006–2025 transport programme (\$m)	2006–15 Central Government Funding (\$m)	2006–15 Local Government Funding (\$m)	2016–25	2026–35
Waikanae Electrification					40
Waikanae upgrade	60		3.25	56.75	
Otaihanga Interchange	35	35			
Western Link Stage 1	65	48.75	16.25		
Western Link Stage 2	35	26.25	8.75		
Western Link Stage 3	40	30	10		
Lindale Bus Rail	10	6	4		
Raumati Station	5	3	2		
Mackays to Lindale DT	62	55.25	6.75		
Transmission Gully	955.4	518		437.4	20.75
Paekakariki Safety	1	1			
Pukerua Bay Safety	2	2			
TGM to SH2 link	44			44	
Porirua bus/rail interchange	10			10 ¹	
Grenada - Gracefield	180	135	45		
TDM	10	15			
Extra Rail Units	40	21	14		
Pukerua Bay - Paekakariki Rail					272 ²
Total Cost	1554.4	896.25	110	548.15	332.75
Available Funding Excluding Tolls³	1554.9	896.75	110	548.15	-

¹ Note: This \$10m to be funded by PCC

² 95th percentile cost, Pukerua Bay to Paekakariki Rail Tunnel Feasibility Report, Beca, March 2005

³ Consultation document records this figure as \$1580m. The figure presented in this table is based on the material provided by Land Transport NZ.

- Funding**
- 1.15 The consultation document and the Project Team emphasised the existence of a funding gap between the TGM and the Coastal Route Upgrade in the second ten year funding period. They asserted that TGM would not qualify for funding from the National Land Transport Fund (NLTF) but that a Mana Bypass could. This created a \$220 million gap for the TGM option. It was also claimed that another component of the plan - the Northern Expressway - would qualify for NLTF funding. \$400 million was earmarked in total in the proposal for the Northern Expressway and component interchanges. The Sub-committee notes that the total WCP claim on N funding for the second 10-year period amounts to \$575 million for a single corridor, and that this is a bold assumption in the light of historical and present trends.
- 1.16 The Sub-committee has had regard to the land transport funding likely to be available within the region. The Sub-committee has concluded that all assumptions about the availability or non-availability of funding must be treated with caution. The submission of Land Transport NZ advised that assumptions about NLTF funding in the proposed WCP for the Mana Bypass and the Northern Expressway were not based on its advice. Indeed, a number of submitters questioned not only those assumptions but suggested that the proposed Western Corridor projects along the Coastal Route had been broken down into components to try and build the chances of some qualifying for NLTF funding through relatively higher BCRs than would be the case if the package was considered as one project. They compared that approach to the Coastal Route Upgrade to the approach to TGM, which was considered as a single project.
- 1.17 Following careful consideration of those issues, we share Land Transport NZ's concerns about the assumptions being made in the proposed WCP about funding available from the NLTF for either the Mana Bypass or the Northern Expressway. It appears to the Sub-committee that the case for NLTF funding being made available for the completion of the TGM is at least equally as strong as the case for funding to be made available for the Mana Bypass or the Northern Expressway
- 1.18 During the course of the hearings, the Project Team advised us that the cost of the TGM was overstated in the consultation document. The cost at the 95th percentile of TGM should fall by approximately \$96 million resulting in a revised estimate of around \$984 million. The Project Team advised us that the figure was \$106 million, although the Treasury review lists the figure as \$96 million. We have used the lower figure. We have not identified the source of the funding for the completion of the suggested WCP in the second 10 year funding period. Given the lack of alignment between the programme for implementation and the 10 year funding cycle, it is not possible to determine the funding source for the second decade at this time. Those inherent uncertainties around the second 10 year funding should not be used as a reason to avoid making the correct long term strategic decision about the future of SH1, now. Future funding will be a political decision to be made in due course.
- 1.19 The Sub-committee is of the view that many of the safety upgrades the Project Team suggest are required on the Coastal Route if TGM proceeds will be unnecessary. The reality is that affected communities and other submitters want TGM and want the current Coastal Route to be effectively a combination of a local road serving coastal communities and those wishing to use the coastal amenities of the Region. Under that scenario, the Coastal Route will effectively become a scenic route in which lower speeds and volumes will prevail. TGM will provide for those interested in fast highway and freight movement. In those circumstances, the grade separations and other proposals for the Coastal Route would be surplus to needs on such a modified local and scenic route. As such the costs for safety improvements along the Coastal Route during the construction and later operation of TGM should be significantly lower.

1.20 There also appears to be an assumption that SH58 will need a considerable upgrade if TGM is to proceed. This has not been demonstrated to the Sub-committee's satisfaction. The projected volumes for that road under the TGM scenario suggest that SH58 may well prove adequate with significantly less expensive levels of investment. The level of upgrading suggested by Transit should not be assumed and should only be acted on when the need has been clearly demonstrated.

The Sub-committee's Findings

1.21 The Sub-committee has found that the affected communities do not support the Coastal Route Upgrade elements of the WCP and have expressed a strong preference for the TGM alternative. The Sub-committee has found, having regard to all of the provisions of S.175 of the LTA, including, in particular the views of affected communities and the need to avoid adverse effects on the environment, that the proposed WCP should be amended to better accord with the provisions of the LTA, the New Zealand Transport Strategy, the provisions of the LTMA, the earlier public commitments of Transit and others, and the land transport funding likely to be available to the Region.

1.22 We believe that amendments to the WCP based on our findings of community views would lead to a plan for the Western Corridor that will contribute to an RLTS able to serve the Region well into the future. Such a WCP, and such an RLTS, would give confidence to the Region that its transport problems are being recognised and addressed as resources become available.

1.23 The approach we have taken addresses the dilemma between the worthy purposes of the LTMA with its new focus on achieving an integrated and sustainable land transport system and the current funding regime and criteria that is perceived by many to apply approaches associated with the previous statutory regime for land transport.

1.24 In coming to our findings, we have been made aware of, and taken into account, the special Crown funding opportunities presented by Government. We recognise the considerable constraints that the land transport funding likely to be available places on the range and extent of investment that can be made in the Western Corridor. We are also aware that there are practices and rules in some agencies around benefit-cost ratios (BCR) that might appear to present a barrier to the investment in strategic, long-term and expensive infrastructure.

1.25 Based on advice received from Land Transport NZ, in our view the current allocation rules and practices, which reflect the provisions of the LTMA, are more flexible than commonly perceived but may need to be reviewed if they present a barrier to the accomplishment of critical, strategic and special projects. We see no legal reason why the historic emphasis on benefit-cost ratios should prevail where they inhibit meeting the purposes of the LTMA for an "integrated, safe, responsive and sustainable land transport system".

Need for a Strategic View

1.26 Submitters raised issues of funding and the problem of historic under-investment in strategic infrastructure over many decades. They expressed concerns about the negative impact of focusing upon 10 year funding programmes and the continuing application of a 10% discount rate when valuing transport investments for long-term, strategic, expensive infrastructure projects. They expressed concern at the failure to appropriately value infrastructure resilience. They submitted that achieving the purposes of the LTMA required a longer term horizon in planning and funding than ten years. They encouraged an approach, more akin to best practice internationally, where major roading and transport infrastructure projects are being discounted in line with a life expectancy in excess of 50 years.

1.27 The evidence of expert submitters is that international best practice uses discount rates of around 3.5 percent rather than the 10 percent prevailing in New Zealand. Their evidence shows that using that discount rate over a realistic period for long-term

infrastructure investment would generate a benefit-cost ratio for TGM of in excess of 1.0. Similarly, if the value of resilience was taken into account and some of the calculations around contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) were properly refined, we believe that the benefits of TGM would be seen to be even more pronounced.

1.28 There are real and present problems of reliability, congestion, community severance, safety and adverse environmental effects arising from current use of existing roading alignments in the Western Corridor, and these problems are projected to deteriorate. There is a strong perception that these problems are stifling regional and national economic activity. In our view, undertaking TGM will have significant economic and productivity growth benefits, it will also reinforce a hierarchy of roads that separates local traffic from the inter-regional traffic, a separation which Transit, in line with international best practice, has attempted to promote elsewhere.

**Role of
Passenger
Transport**

1.29 Some submitters were of the view that the time had arrived to shift the focus of land transport expenditure from road to other forms of transportation, particularly train and buses, to obtain a better rail/road balance of capital expenditure. There is no doubt that further resources should be applied to upgrading and extending public transport facilities. There are real opportunities for rail and bus services to be improved in the WCP and our amended programme includes them. However, there are major deficiencies in the current roading network that need to be addressed as a priority. The problems along the corridor are much wider than the peak commute demand.

1.30 Submitters argued that the Region has unusual geographical and topographical characteristics that limit the range of options to improve its roading infrastructure, and making unusually expensive any serious attempt to fix infrastructure problems that there has not been enough commitment in the past to solve. Those problems also affect the rail infrastructure which, like the current SH1 between Pukerua Bay and Paekakariki, is very fragile in parts. We heard evidence to suggest that expenditure in excess of \$1 billion would be required to bring rail services in the Region up to a modern standard.

1.31 Whilst submitters were clear in their support of improved rail and increased investment in public transport, they were also clear that rail and buses alone would not solve the Region's freight and people transport problems nor ensure the integrity of the national road transport network.

1.32 The Sub-committee finds that the major works that should be included within the final WCP will be long term assets of lasting benefit to the social, environmental and economic wellbeing of the Region and the nation. Submitters left us in no doubt that there was urgency in the need to address the existing land transport deficiencies, before it could be said the Region had an integrated, safe, responsive and sustainable land transport system generally or in its Western Corridor.

1.33 Many submitters called for political leadership nationally, regionally and locally to address the Region's infrastructural deficiencies, especially in relation to both rail and road. There was considerable frustration expressed over the number of reports presented without significant progress on major issues, construction delays and cost over-runs, travel time uncertainties and insensitive consultation. These issues will need to be faced up to if public confidence in the relevant public agencies is to be restored.

1.34 The consistent plea from submitters was for action, not more reports.

**Need for
Regional
Coordination**

1.35 Whatever is decided for the WCP, it must be coordinated with other sections of the RLTS. There was concern expressed that expenditure on major works in the Western Corridor may cause other necessary works in the Region to be postponed. The Sub-committee considers that it is unwise to attempt to 'second-guess' either the funding

needs of works in other corridors or funding availability for them. The immediate issues are the finalisation of a WCP and the development of an integrated RLTS with Regional backing.

- 1.36 Many submitters have been particularly concerned to ensure that the connections between the WCP and other corridor plans are not distorted by resolution of the WCP. The RLTC will be aware of the problems that can arise for the Region with a funding package on the table which focuses upon one part of the Region. It would not be advantageous to any part of the Region, or the Region's long term development as a whole, if the Region was unable to uplift that package because of anxieties about the future funding of works in other corridors that have not yet been fully investigated, defined or consulted upon. It is preferable in our view to identify what provides the best value for the WCP within the funding package, so that it can be uplifted. Once the needs of other Corridors in the Region are identified in the RLTS, regional efforts can then be directed through the RLTC to organise the necessary funding to support those works.
- 1.37 The Wellington Region needs its RLTS. However without Regional agreement to a WCP and movement on the adoption of an RLTS, implementation of any effective road and rail transport solutions will be delayed, and public frustration, even anger, clearly evident throughout this consultation phase, will grow. The stronger and more united is the Regional commitment to this WCP and an agreed RLTS the more likely it will be that this and other corridor plans will be funded and implemented.
- 1.38 The proposed WCP might address longstanding SH1 problems. However, significant questions exist over its consentability. The views of affected communities have overwhelmingly demonstrated that such a proposal would likely result in adverse effects on the natural, built and social environments. If proceeded with as proposed, the WCP would be strongly resisted at all stages of what would, in any case, be a complex consenting process. There is little doubt that the consenting process would be long, difficult and divisive. The outcome would be uncertain and the processes would be extremely expensive. There is little doubt that the consenting process, even if successful, would quite likely involve extensive and expensive mitigation projects. After considering all the material placed before us we are not confident that designations, resource consents and archaeological authorities for key elements of either the Coastal Route Upgrade or the Coastal Incremental Upgrade will be attainable, or, if attainable, would come with significant limitations, modifications or mitigation costs to address community concerns.

**Effects on
Communities**

- 1.39 It was argued by many submitters that the environmental damage, the irremediable community dislocation, the community road user disruption extending up to 25 years and the detrimental health consequences for the coastal communities from upgrading the Coastal Route to four lanes would be contrary to the purposes of the LTMA and the matters that must be considered under S.175(2) of the LTA when a RLTS is prepared. Particularly relevant are S.175 (2) (e) and (f) of the LTA which require that a RLTS must:

“(e) avoid, to the extent reasonable in the circumstances, adverse effects on the environment: and

(f) take into account the views of affected communities.”

**Tangata
Whenua
Issues**

- 1.40 The Sub-committee received formal submissions during the hearing of submissions from Te Runanga o Ngati Toa Rangatira and Te Ati Awa ki Whakarongotai, principal Māori authorities with particular interests in the central portion of the Western Corridor. The Sub-committee also received submissions from the Pukerua 3A6 Urupa Trustees who have the care of the urupa in Pukerua Bay. The Māori consultancy Raukura Consultants as well as other interested Māori also made submissions against the Coastal

Route Upgrade. The Sub-committee was informed that Māori were seriously concerned about the impact of the proposals as follows:

- the Mana Bypass – the intrusion into Ngati Toa Domain, considered a site of great cultural significance
- the Pukerua Bay Bypass – its impacts on a site of urupa
- the Centennial Highway – an area of great environmental, cultural, ecological, food gathering and coastal significance.

The Sub-committee was informed that any attempt to obtain designations, consents and archaeological authorities for works in any of those areas would be vigorously opposed through all legal avenues.

1.41 The Māori interests supported the development of TGM.

Coastal Effects 1.42 The environmental impact of elements of the Coastal Route Upgrade such as the Mana Bypass, the Pukerua Bay Bypass and extending Centennial Highway 15 metres (possibly up to 40 metres) into the sea, will clearly be significant. The implications of the adverse environmental impacts of those proposals and the strongly held views of affected communities against them cannot be minimised. This is particularly the case because the provisions of S.175 (2) (h) of the LTA require the consideration of “options” and “alternatives” when preparing RLTSs. The impact on coastal communities most affected by the proposed works is considered to be serious. The loss of South Beach at Plimmerton will be strenuously opposed by a wide sector of the Regional community, including, but extending beyond, Plimmerton residents.

Route Security 1.43 SH1 is a road of national significance and should be considered as such. It is also a vital lifeline for Wellington. The Wellington Lifelines Group submitted that the reinstatement of land transport access following a major natural disaster was an important factor to be considered. Using a risk analysis the Group identified the vulnerability of the Coastal Route compared with TGM and that basic access could be restored within a week for TGM while delays could be of a matter of months for the Coastal Route and other key access routes. Transit’s expert on geotechnical matters has advised us that:

“the likelihood is that slope failure on the Coastal Route would be greater than on the current TGM design.”

He has also stated to the Sub-committee that on the Centennial Highway

“The application of slope stabilisation works to reduce the susceptibility of the slopes to earthquake induced landslides is not considered practical or economically justifiable, even if it were possible to positively identify which slopes required treatment.”

In short, the ability to secure the Coastal Route on the Centennial Highway alignment from Pukerua Bay to Paekakariki is very low.

1.44 We heard slightly differing views from road transport interests about the usability of TGM for heavy vehicle freight traffic. Local heavy vehicle operators expressed support for using TGM. The Road Transport Forum however indicated a preference for the Coastal Route Upgrade on the basis of the cost differential, but if TGM was built, and the existing Coastal Route became a local road, operators would use TGM.

Alternatives to Coastal Route 1.45 Were there no reasonable alternative to the full upgrade of the current SH1 envisaged by the proposed WCP, GW and/or Transit may be able to demonstrate that there was no option but to proceed with the proposed WCP in spite of the earlier assurances by Transit. There clearly is an alternative to the Coastal Route. TGM has long been identified by Transit as the long term preferred route for SH1. Is TGM a reasonable alternative? Subject to the completion of geotechnical investigations, the evidence suggests it is.

Transit has said it is and has obtained the necessary designations and purchased a significant proportion of the land needed. The submitters by a substantial majority say it is. Opinion surveys show that a significant majority of the public believes it is. There are Environment Court decisions that say it is. The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment said it was in the 1990s. Those realities illustrate the difficulties which will be faced in getting the necessary designations and consents for a Coastal Route Upgrade.

**Transit's
Commitment**

1.46 In the papers provided to the Sub-Committee recording the advice provided to the Government in 2005 preceding the Government announcement of a funding package for the Region, the Sub-committee found no reference to either the Environment Court's decision in 2001 or Transit's earlier commitments to GW, PCC and the public about the longer term future of TGM. Whether these undertakings would preclude Transit seeking the required designations and consents for the Coastal Route Upgrade or Coastal Incremental Upgrade can only be determined by the Court. The Sub-committee finds that Transit's previous undertakings will be used as a basis for opposing designations and consents.

1.47 Some have suggested that the difference between TGM and the proposed Coastal Route Upgrade in relation to cost estimates might mean that the TGM would not be considered an alternative to the Coastal Route proposals under the LTA. But the LTA requires consideration not of the relative costs of alternative projects, but of *"the land transport funding likely to be available within the Region during the period covered by the strategy."* Given the uncertainty around mitigation costs, and the cost of community disruption during construction, many submitters consider the cost variation may be minimal or not so great as to rule TGM out as a reasonable option. We note the position as revealed in the Treasury review of cost estimates, particularly the following two extracts:

**Comparative
Costs**

"The choice between competing packages for the Western Corridor involves the consideration of a wide range of impacts. These include potential environmental degradation, effects on the community, impacts on urban form and development, transport efficiency and financial costs. Treasury's project needs to be seen in this wider context, as it only deals with financial impacts and hence represents an input into only one component of the overall decision." (p5)

"While there does not appear to be significant disagreement over the costings of individual roading projects with the Western Corridor, there remains a substantial degree of uncertainty over the costs.

The cost estimates for TG are more developed and less uncertain than those for the CR, due primarily to the fact that there is already a designation in place for TG. Consequently, the cost bracket around the CR is wider than that for TG, and at the 95th percentile the Peer Review team's cost estimates for the CR (although not Maunsell's estimates) are actually above the cost estimates for TG. However, the cost estimates for TG are themselves still quite uncertain." (p17)

1.48 Overall, it is likely that there may be some cost differential between TGM and the Coastal Route Upgrade. The Sub-committee is of the view that having regard to S.175(2) of the LTA, cost alone cannot be the major determinant of the preferred option. Furthermore, given the uncertainty around current cost estimates, the Sub-committee sees TGM as a real alternative to the Coastal Route Upgrade under the conditions and provisions of the LTA.

**Strategic
Issues**

1.49 GW now faces an important strategic decision, whether to include the proposed Coastal Route Upgrade of SH1, or to adopt TGM for incorporation in the RLTS as the future corridor for SH1. The public consultation undertaken indicates that there would be overwhelming support for a decision to incorporate TGM.

**The
Consenting
Strategy**

- 1.50 If GW does incorporate TGM into the RLTS, Transit faces the important strategic decision of whether to proceed on that basis and abandon its proposals for the Coastal Route Upgrade. If it proceeds with the Coastal Route Upgrade, Transit will need to carefully consider the implications of s.12(5) of the LTMA requiring it to take into account the RLTS in preparing its Land Transport Programme and implementing its suggested Consenting Strategy.
- 1.51 Both decisions are of strategic importance to the long term prosperity and economic growth of the Wellington Region and the social, environmental and cultural wellbeing of the Region and local communities.
- 1.52 However the Sub-committee observes that Transit Board resolutions on the matter have not predetermined any position. This is explicit in the case of the Consenting Strategy and also clear in the case of proposals approved as suitable for consultation. The Transit Board resolutions inserted conditions around consenting strategies showing a reasonable prospect of success, and *"confirmation of a significant cost saving for a coastal highway route when compared with TGM"*. This Report underlines the relevance and significance of those conditions.
- 1.53 We have noted the following comments in the Treasury review of cost estimates related to the Coastal Route Upgrade and TGM respectively (p24):
- "The evidence presented to the RLTC and available to the public adequately conveys the situation with regard to cost uncertainty, and the decision to collect more information on both options through the Consenting Strategy for the CR and the geotechnical study for TG is a sensible way to manage the cost risks and inform future decisions."*
- In the same report Treasury has said (p2):
- "On current cost estimates, the CR is able to be funded from within the projected funding envelope using relatively orthodox assumptions. Should the specification of the CR option change and costs escalate due to greater mitigation being required, some components of the CR package (or possibly other projects in the Region) would need to be deferred or foregone."*
- 1.54 The approach in the Treasury review of cost estimates appears to be to accept and act on the Consenting Strategy. It appears to describe that approach as *"... the normal decision making process relating to road projects of this nature. ... the process should be allowed to continue in the normal fashion."* The Consenting Strategy refers to the process to be followed to obtain consents under the RMA and any other legislative requirements to enable the projects in the WCP to proceed to construction.
- 1.55 The opinion included in the Treasury's review of cost estimates appears to have been expressed without adequate consideration to the relevant provisions of the LTA, LTMA or a consideration of the matters raised in our Report. As such, we have considered it necessary to emphasise in this report the significance of the new statutory regime applicable to the development of RLTSs and the requirement to take into account environmental effects and the views of affected communities (see S.175 (2) (f) and (h) of the LTA).
- 1.56 It is the view of the Sub-committee that continuing "in the normal fashion" cannot mean proceeding without having regard to the views of affected communities. The views of affected communities are not represented in the current Consenting Strategy prepared for current proposals in the WCP. Nor has that Consenting Strategy been accepted by the Transit Board.
- 1.57 The affected communities are likely to see pursuing the Consenting Strategy as a form of the creeping incrementalism about which submitters were so critical. Affected


communities expressed the view that, based on past experience, they would be alert to any risk of creeping incrementalism and would strenuously oppose any efforts by Transit to achieve its objectives by that means. As our report indicates, the community has expressed clearly what its views are and, in particular, its opposition to the Coastal Route Upgrade including what they consider major works at Paekakariki and Airlie Road.

- 1.58 The technical barriers to simply pursuing the Consenting Strategy in the context of the current law cannot be ignored. Before a Consenting Strategy can be adopted and acted upon in this instance, GW must first adopt a RLTS which contains a WCP in respect to which Transit seeks designations and consents to undertake State Highway projects Transit may wish to advance. There are statutory requirements to be met under the provisions of the LTA in adopting a RLTS. The views of affected communities on the issues involved are important and must be seen to have been taken into account in adopting the RLTS. In developing its Land Transport Programme to provide for the implementation of the Coastal Route Upgrade, Transit must take into account the RLTS. Not surprisingly, given that Treasury was asked to advise on matters around the cost estimations, the Sub-committee finds that the Treasury review of cost estimate matters does not adequately recognise the implications of the statutory framework within which the implementation of Land Transport Programmes and activities must fit. Proceeding with a Consenting Strategy for specific projects before the WCP is incorporated into the RLTS would seem premature.
- 1.59 The proposed WCP, without amendment, would be contrary to the views of the affected communities as expressed through more than 6000 submissions and many hundreds of submitters appearing. Given the clear expression of views by affected communities during the public consultation phase upon which we are reporting, the suggestion that implementation of the Consenting Strategy is the obvious way forward needs to be treated with most careful consideration before being endorsed or adopted.

The Way Forward

- 1.60 From the many submissions received and considered by us and to assist GW and Transit make further decisions on the content of a WCP for inclusion in the RLTS, we have identified a modified WCP based on the community support for TGM, and capable of being funded within the proposed funding package for the period 2006 – 2025. If adopted, the modifications we suggest to the proposed WCP would resolve the future of SH1, and enable consequential decisions to be made on other land transport issues, including further upgrading of rail and bus services. We have identified in this report some consequential amendments which could be made should our findings be adopted.
- 1.61 Regrettably we could find no cheaper or easier solution to the major transport problems which the consultation process confirmed. The conclusion that the Wellington Region faces a significant need for substantial investment in infrastructure (both rail and road) for the Western Corridor and elsewhere after years of under-investment cannot be avoided. In our view the proposed WCP cannot be the preferred solution having regard to the provisions of S.175(2) of the LTA. We do, however, consider the modifications that we have suggested (set out on the next page in Figure 1) meet the balance anticipated by the legislation.

Figure 1: Amended Western Corridor Plan



2 Context for the Hearings on the Proposed Western Corridor Plan

Introduction

- 2.1 The proposed WCP includes public transport improvements, travel demand management initiatives, and a staged programme of roading improvements, with the aim of providing an affordable, safe, efficient, reliable and sustainable Western Corridor transportation network for the benefit of the Wellington Region and the nation. Details of the components of the plan are set out in Annex 1.
- 2.2 The WCP has been released for public consultation by GWRC and Transit, and after any amendments the WCP will become part of the Wellington RLTS. In preparing its Land Transport Programme, which includes specific projects in the Western Corridor, Transit must take into account the provisions of the RLTS (refer S.12(5) of the LTMA).

REGIONAL LAND TRANSPORT COMMITTEE RESOLUTIONS

- 2.3 On 29 August 2005, the Regional Land Transport Committee met to approve a draft Proposed WCP for the purposes of public consultation. The committee chose to make five amendments to the Proposed WCP. The relevant Regional Land Transport Committee resolutions are:

"That the Committee:

- Approves the proposed WCP, as amended, for formal public consultation carried out under the terms of the Land Transport Management Act.*
- Agrees that, given the uncertainties around aspects of the Coastal Route, the public consultation on the proposed WCP also invite views on alternative routes, particularly TGM, for the central roading section.*
- Notes the board of Transit New Zealand has accepted the draft Corridor Plan as suitable for formal submissions and hearings.*
- Notes the Project Technical Group believes an upgraded Coastal Route would provide sufficient capacity to meet the demands of a 20-year high population growth scenario but that it would be prudent to retain the option of TGM, as a possible long term solution for the Western Corridor, to future-proof Regional access.*
- Notes the reservations expressed in the Programme and Cost Review about the buildability and consentability of the Coastal Route and the differing timeframes for constructing the Coastal Route and TGM.*
- Notes the need for Transit New Zealand and appropriate local authorities to develop a detailed Western Corridor Implementation Plan, including a strategy for obtaining consents for a long-term coastal corridor option, which shows a reasonable prospect of success.*
- Agrees that if the Coastal Route proves to be unconsentable, and consequently an alternative such as TGM is adopted as the preferred project, that Government be requested to assist with an appropriate funding package involving Crown, users, and local authorities.*
- Notes that the final decision on the content of the WCP will be made following the public consultation process, and taking into account all cultural, economic, environmental, social, costing and technical information, as well as the availability of a robust Consenting Strategy for the Coastal Route.*

- *Agrees that as part of the consultation process, substantial efforts are made to clearly explain the background and to communicate issues”.*

TRANSIT NEW ZEALAND RESOLUTIONS

2.4 Transit New Zealand’s Board met on 3 August 2005 and resolved that the Board:

- *“Accepts the draft corridor plan as suitable for formal submissions and hearings*
- *Agrees that Transit’s proposals for a final corridor plan will be subject to, inter alia:*
 - *confirmation that the completed Consenting Strategy for a coastal highway route shows a reasonable prospect of success*
 - *confirmation of a significant cost saving for a coastal highway route when compared with TGM at acceptable levels of cost and time risk*
 - *confirmation, on the basis of short term performance monitoring, that the Transit High Occupancy Vehicle lanes at Mana are predicted to perform satisfactorily over the next ten years.”*

2.5 The Sub-committee has taken careful note of the Transit Board’s resolutions and has not interpreted these to suggest that the Board has resiled from the previously-stated position that TGM is the *“long term preferred route for SH 1”*. We note that the decision of Cabinet of 4 July 2005 to make available \$405 million for State Highway 1 construction between Wellington and Kapiti between 2007/08 and 2015/16 has required Transit to consider how it could apply this limited amount of funding which appeared not to be sufficient to progress TGM. The fact that the Cabinet’s decision was aimed at *“advancing a long-term solution”* has placed Transit in a difficult position and prompted a reconsideration of a Coastal Route Upgrade.

2.6 In reviewing the available options the Transit Board has decided that pursuing the proposed Coastal Route Upgrade rested on satisfying four important conditions:

- that the Consenting Strategy must have *“a reasonable prospect of success”*
- the cost savings over TGM must be *“significant”*
- the levels of risk related to cost and time must be *“acceptable”*
- the HOV lanes at Mana must be able to perform satisfactorily over the 10-year period.

STATUTORY CONTEXT


2.7 The proposed WCP has been prepared with the objective of the (amended, if required) Plan forming part of a draft revised RLTS, to be consulted upon. Thus it is important to understand that while the proposed WCP is essentially a programme of Land Transport Activities (to be developed as Land Transport Programmes under S.12 of the LTMA), any final plan will also form a part of an amended RLTS. The Sub-committee has thus been faced with having to undertake its deliberations on the WCP in the light of the requirements applying to the preparation of an RLTS and Land Transport Programmes. Relevant extracts from the two Acts are set out in Annex 2 and briefly summarised in the discussion below.

2.8 The LTMA was enacted in November 2003. The LTMA significantly changed the funding and management of land transport to contribute to the aim of achieving an integrated, safe, responsive, and sustainable land transport system. The objectives of the LTMA are to:

- *assist economic development*
- *assist safety and personal security*
- *improve access and mobility*
- *protect and promote public health*
- *ensure environmental sustainability.*

- 2.9 The LTMA also amended the Local Government Act 1974, the Transit New Zealand Act 1989, and the LTA. The latter contains the provisions relating to RLTSs.
- 2.10 The new S.175(2) of the LTA requires that an RLTS contribute to achieving an integrated, safe, responsive and sustainable land transport system. In doing so it must take into account how the strategy will assist, together with other matters, economic development, safety and personal security, improve access and mobility, protect and promote public health, and ensure environmental sustainability. It must also take into account the land transport funding likely to be available. Significant import is given to taking into account the views of various stakeholders including local communities and land transport network providers.
- 2.11 Environmental impacts are given particular emphasis because an RLTS is expected to not only ensure environmental sustainability but also avoid *“to the extent reasonable in the circumstances, adverse effects on the environment...”*
- 2.12 It is also important to note that the Sub-committee’s remit is only to address the proposed WCP, which, in turn, is only part of the Regional picture. The RLTC has the responsibility to incorporate the WCP and its various projects into a robust revision of the RLTS and to present that revised RLTS for further consultation. In order for the proposed WCP to be incorporated into the RLTS the RLTC (and ultimately GW) needs to ensure that all the requirements of S.175(2) of the LTA are complied with (refer Annex 2). Figure 2 below illustrates those relationships.

Figure 2: Statutory and Planning Relationships



GOVERNMENT FUNDING COMMITMENTS

- 2.13 In preparing the proposed WCP likely funding of \$1,006,750,000 (GST exclusive) was identified as being realistic for the period ending 30 June 2016. This amount was made up of a mixture of Crown grants, NLTF Funding, Regional funding (from petrol taxes), and funding from local Councils. The Sub-committee has been advised that that funding is broken down as follows:
- \$94 million from the \$160 million granted by the Crown (between 2005/06 and 2014/15) intended for investment in strategic roading, transport demand management and enhanced passenger transport to reduce congestion and improve access. According to Land Transport NZ's Performance Agreement (see Annex 3) this money can be used to contribute to a local authority's share of costs for relevant projects from this additional Crown Contribution. This funding has been given the C1 identifier.
 - \$255 million (between 2007/08 and 2015/16) intended as additional Crown investment in passenger transport and roading to address congestion, improve safety and improve access reliability on the Western Corridor. This funding has been given the C2 identifier.
 - \$405 million (between 2007/08 and 2015/16) is intended for State highway construction to advance a long term solution to address access reliability for State Highway 1 between Wellington and Kapiti. This funding has been given the C3 identifier.
 - \$74.75 million in National Land Transport Programme funding. This funding has been given the N identifier.
 - \$68 million in Regional (petrol tax) funding. This funding has been given the R identifier.
 - \$45 million in funding by the Wellington City Council (WCC) for the Petone-Grenada Link Road.
 - \$35 million in funding by the Kapiti Coast District Council (KCDC) for the Western Link Road.
 - \$30 million in funding by GW.
- 2.14 Aside from the above funding the Crown has granted the Wellington Region \$65 million (between 2005/06 and 2014/15) intended for investment in infrastructure and services (primarily rail) to maintain passenger transport mode share. We have been advised by Land Transport NZ that its performance agreement notes that Crown funding can be used to assist GW meet its share of the costs on the condition that GW has agreed to raise additional rates revenue estimated to be \$95 million over ten years. The Sub-committee notes that none of this money was allocated to the proposed WCP.
- 2.15 A further \$538.15 million was suggested in the proposed WCP as the likely funding envelope for the period beginning 1 July 2017 and ending in 1 July 2025. As no Crown grants had been made for this period it was assumed in the proposed WCP that most of this funding would be from the National Land Transport Programme.
- 2.16 In the proposed WCP it was suggested that some of the Crown grant money had been tagged to specific projects such as the Coastal Route Upgrade or the Petone-Grenada Link Road. From its reading of relevant Cabinet decisions, the Land Transport NZ Performance Agreement, and a number of public assurances from Ministers on this subject, the Sub-committee finds that this suggestion of tagging was incorrect. Papers associated with Cabinet decision presented to the Sub-committee had referred to possible uses for these funds, but the actual decisions had not specified the specific projects that would be funded.

The Sub-committee

- 2.17 The Sub-committee was established as a Sub-committee of the RLTC to hear and consider the submissions made on the proposed WCP and to prepare a report presenting its findings to the RLTC and Transit's Board. The Sub-committee's brief (set out in Annex 4 to this Report) was to hear and consider written and oral submissions on the proposed WCP. After consideration of the outcomes of the consultation, and consideration of the Consenting Strategy, the Community Survey and any technical advice and clarification, the Sub-committee has been asked to provide a preliminary review of the proposed WCP and detail its findings with conclusions .
- 2.18 The Chair of the Sub-committee is Terry McDavitt (Chair of the RLTC). The other members are:
- Alan Bickers (Public and private sector consultant, appointed by Transit New Zealand).
 - Sir Brian Elwood (former Chief Ombudsman).
 - Charles Finny (CEO Wellington Regional Chamber of Commerce).
 - Kay Saville Smith (Sociologist, Centre for Evaluation and Social Assessment (CRESA) Ltd).
- 2.19 Annex 5 of this Report contains detail on the members of the Sub-committee, their qualifications and experience. The process they followed is set out in Annex 4.
- 2.20 The Sub-committee faced a large task. It was required to analyse 6017 submissions. It heard the oral submissions of 394 submitters, and in all read an estimated 40,000 pages of material. The Sub-committee toured the areas affected by the proposed Coastal Route Upgrade. In responding to its Terms of Reference, the Sub-committee has recognised the overwhelming desire expressed in submissions, both written and oral, that the delays, uncertainties, anxieties and frustration around the transport future of the Region come to an end. The Sub-committee's observations, findings and conclusions expressed in this Report are directed at providing the Region, and indeed, because of the importance of SH 1 and Wellington's role as the connector between the islands, the nation, with a practical pathway forward.

3 Submitter Views and the Sub-committee Response: General Issues

Introduction

- 3.1 It is often assumed that responses to a call for public submissions bring forward only the views of the committed partisan or the directly affected. The Sub-committee wishes to record that a striking feature of the submissions received on the proposed WCP is the number of high-quality submissions expressing well-considered and cogent views, and presenting pertinent expert and often new information. Amongst this group for example are submissions from qualified and often independent professionals, including those from the following disciplines:
- marine biologists
 - geologists
 - meteorologists
 - medical practitioners
 - urban designers
 - civil engineers
 - quantity surveyors
 - policy analysts
 - members of Parliament
 - iwi advisers
 - rail operators and drivers
 - archaeologists
 - investment analysts
 - teachers
 - economists
 - sociologists
 - psychologists
 - emergency service planners and operators
 - theologians
 - coastal scientists
 - lawyers.
- 3.2 The Sub-committee observes that the material presented by submitters amounts to a significant body of work to which any agency with a continuing interest in these issues would be well-advised to refer.
- 3.3 Overall, the public submissions to the proposed WCP provide three critical commentaries. First, the submissions provide a commentary on the issues that the public believes should inform decisions about land transport in the Region. Second, the submissions also comment on the adequacy of the evidential and analytic basis for the proposed plan, particularly in relation to the transport modelling, the construction and application of the Planning Balance Sheet (PBS) and the costing of the various elements of the

proposed plan and TGM. Finally, the submissions provide strong statements about the relative merits, benefits and impacts of the various projects and key elements of the proposed plan.

- 3.4 This section discusses those important issues raised by submitters at a general level. The following section discusses submitter's views on individual key components of the plan. This section considers submitter's views and presents the Sub-committee's findings on the:
- framework in which decisions should be made
 - evidential base underpinning the WCP proposals.

Decision-Making Framework

- Submitter's Views**
- 3.5 The submissions represented a community wide agreement that the decision making framework should deal with two relevant policy issues:
- The need to address inadequacies in the current transport network, having regard to the available funding, but not being predetermined or unnecessarily constrained by past funding mechanisms or procedures.
 - The need to plan the future transport network in a manner which acknowledges the significant directional change in how land transport plans are developed and legislative purposes are to be achieved following the passing into law of the LTMA.
- 3.6 The submitters on the proposed WCP overwhelmingly saw that they were confronted with critical strategic choices. They encouraged all involved to adopt a framework of decision-making that would be strategically oriented and directed to ensuring a 'future-proofed' land transport network sustainable for at least the next fifty to one hundred years.
- 3.7 Critical issues that submitters repeatedly identified as needing to be addressed were:
- Ensuring that the Capital had a resilient road and rail network rather than reliance on a fragile Coastal Route vulnerable not only to extreme events such as major earthquakes and tsunamis but also able to cope with more frequently experienced disruptions arising from extreme weather events and traffic incidents.
 - The need to ensure that the construction of road improvements did not impose significant economic and environmental costs on users and communities over extended periods of time.
 - The need to better integrate east-west traffic across the western and Hutt corridors.
 - The need to better integrate rail and public transport.
 - The need to separate local, regional and national traffic.
 - The need to protect the unique characteristics, amenities, and heritage of the Region and local communities.
 - The need to invest for the future.
 - The need to provide a flexible land transport system that could deal with changes conditions and circumstances ranging from the impacts of rising oil prices and reduced availability of fossil fuels to climate change.
 - The need to better integrate land use with transport networks and hierarchies to encourage more concentrated nodal settlement forms and to avoid urban sprawl.
- 3.8 One-third of written submissions presented material on resilience. Among submitters presenting to the Sub-committee, it was observed that a majority of submitters placed a real value on network resilience. The current infrastructure, both rail and road, is seen

as vulnerable not only to major earthquakes but to relatively frequent weather events and, on the road, delays arising from construction works and traffic incidents. Delays arising from the lack of resilience have real costs for individuals and for the Region.

- 3.9 For the Region, the Sub-committee has heard evidence from submitters such as 2031, 3740, 3984, 3988 and 4976 that producers, manufacturers and distributors are seriously considering alternative locations such as using Palmerston North as a point of air departure rather than Wellington. We have also been given evidence that the potential of the Wellington Port is being constrained by the uncertainty of travel times on SH1. Submitters saw that the lack of resilience in the current network and the prospect of up to 24 years of road construction on the Coastal Route if it proceeds provides little optimism that the proposed WCP will assist economic development and productivity growth.
- 3.10 The Sub-committee notes that Land Transport NZ has observed that the Region has not collected systematic data on travel reliability. However, the Sub-committee has found that submitters have given overwhelming evidence of regular delays on SH1 and unpredictable travel times in the Western Corridor. They have reported negative impacts on their quality of life as those delays affect their relationships with family and friends and use up their discretionary time. They have reported the costs associated with lost work hours and business. They report inconveniences small and large including disrupted domestic and international travel as flights leaving Wellington Airport are missed. They report compromised health and difficulties in reaching critical health services situated in Wellington City. Those involved in emergency services have described to us the risks associated with fragile access. Members of the health sector have submitted to us the costs to the health sector as people are unable to meet specialist appointments and health workers become delayed and/or unable to reach their places of employment. The Sub-committee observes that data gaps on network reliability need to be addressed.
- 3.11 Almost all submitters wanted a WCP that separates local, regional and national traffic. This was particularly eloquently expressed by submitters 5602 and 5955. They argue that expressways and motorways would assist in that separation and most believe that it will encourage more concentrated settlement forms which can be held together by public transport and access to arterial bypasses, motorways and other link roads.
- 3.12 Submitters were overwhelmingly of the view that 'cheap' options were not always the best option. They had pronounced views on how funding constraints should be addressed in the Sub-committee's own process of deliberation and in future decision-making. They encouraged the Sub-committee to examine the merits of strategic options without allowing the assessment of merit to be determined by funding which at any point of time appears to be available.
- 3.13 Land Transport NZ (submission 2272) advised that an assessment of the merits and benefits of all elements of the proposed WCP, including the Coastal Route Upgrade projects, is still required. We also note that Land Transport NZ clarified its views regarding appropriate assessment of the merits and practicability of different strategic options. They advised us that the examination of merit should not be based on mechanistic weighting and balancing of the objectives in the LTMA or its requirements to have regard to likely available funding, but rather on a detailed and careful judgement made using an iterative process of appraising all the evidence in relation to the provisions of the LTMA and LTA.
- 3.14 In the written submissions, over 1000 submitters addressed issues around affordability. Submitters, such as 2521 (Automobile Association) and 4563 (Employers and Manufacturers' Association), made a significant distinction between affordability and funding

availability. Others, such as 166, 4785 and 5287 commented on various interpretations of "cost": A number of submitters, including economists (5777 and 5972), pointed out that whether various options were seen as 'affordable' depended primarily on the application of particular discount rates and the period over which the capital costs of a project could be spread. Submitters argued that the assessment of affordability should be made on the basis of the use value of infrastructure projects over timeframes in excess of 25 years.

- 3.15 Land Transport NZ agreed in their submission that major infrastructure needs to be seen as a long term investment. Confirmation of this point, made initially in oral submission by Land Transport NZ, was received by the Sub-committee on 13 February 2006 – "...the life of an RLTS is only 10 years, but we believe the transport planning behind the RLTS should be over 20, if not 30, years."
- 3.16 Overall, submitters argued that funding availability was not the primary criterion in the LTA on which to evaluate the relative merits of strategic options. They encouraged the Sub-committee to consider, first, the extent to which strategic options aligned well to the aim and objectives of the LTMA and, second, the implications and management of funding constraints. They pointed out that the relevant clause in S.175 (2)(d) of the LTA is one factor to take into account amongst others, and is not phrased to be an overriding consideration.
- 3.17 The Sub-committee notes the inclusion of modest statements around desirable land use policies in the proposed WCP. Most submitters who addressed these, and particularly the local Councils, endorsed the proposals. However, many submitters including Councils, discussed land use issues at some length, and there were differences of opinion about the impact of different land transport options on urban form.
- Sub-committee's Response** 3.18 The Sub-committee agrees that what confronts the Wellington Region is a strategic decision. We are concerned that, at times, the decisions around the proposed WCP have been presented as if they are simply decisions around various design options for particular projects. This is not the case. The LTA is clear that communities are to be involved in setting the direction of land transport decisions through a hierarchy of the RLTSs, the various corridor plans which then become translated into programmes and then design options for projects and activities within the strategic framework already decided.
- 3.19 These are new requirements which arise from statutory changes in 2003. The days in which communities are only to be involved in submitting on the impact and mitigation of very specific design options late in the process are over. The LTA and LTMA give communities the opportunity to input at the point of strategy development and decision-making on strategic choices. In our view, all the agencies involved have yet to face up to the challenges introduced by that new statutory environment.
- 3.20 The Sub-committee also finds that the WCP needs to be considered in the wider context of the RLTS with individual components being required to harmonize with adjoining corridor proposals. The Sub-committee sees no barrier to this being achieved with work already under way such as on the Wellington City Corridor from Ngauranga to Wellington Airport or already completed such as on the Hutt Corridor. Moving on the former is of particular import to the Region to ensure that any benefits of either the current or the amended WCP are realised.
- 3.21 With regard to the inadequacies of the land transport network, on the basis of the evidence presented by submitters, the Sub-committee finds that the issue of land transport network resilience has not been adequately addressed in the proposed WCP, the value given by affected communities to a resilient land transport system has not been recognised, and the benefits of a resilient network have been understated.

- 3.22 The Sub-committee notes that it is now considered best practice here and overseas for significant arterial connections to be taken out of communities and bypass them using lands that have lower economic, amenity, community and environmental value. Submitters had identified this practice in Europe, Great Britain, Australia and in the 'smart growth' strategy of consolidating coastal communities and separating intra-state/inter-state traffic along the west coast of the United States of America. Part of our findings in relation to the Coastal Route Upgrade proposal are founded on the principle that health and safety, efficiency, and liveable communities and their associated amenity and environmental values, can be best ensured when local and inter-regional traffic are separated, and where traffic to local destinations is separated from long-distance, point to point through traffic. The current proposals for the Coastal Route are unlikely to meet such an objective.
- 3.23 The Sub-committee is aware of the parallel process of the Wellington Regional Strategy and that its focus on regional land use issues means that it is ideally placed to consider these issues. The Sub-committee observes the following:
- The important planning principles of the separation of road functions and the practice of maintaining a hierarchy of roads should be written into District Plans. For example, TGM as a proposed motorway would have access by way of specific and a limited number of interchanges. District Plans should ensure that land use adjoining motorways does not conflict with the arterial function;
 - All subdivisional activity generates traffic. The direct responsibility for avoiding conflict between land use and preserving the capacity of arterial and local roads rests with the respective territorial authorities.
- 3.24 In the course of these hearings, submitters have identified the Pauatahanui Inlet as a particularly sensitive environmental area which has been adversely affected by past sub-divisional activity and associated increased volumes of traffic. In our deliberations, the Sub-committee has been careful to avoid roading alignments which would impose further negative consequences on the Pauatahanui Inlet.
- 3.25 Establishing and maintaining the integrity of the roading hierarchy is also dependent on local authorities in the Region having a sound land use management system. Submitters agreed that settlements should be consolidated around local road nodes and public transport nodes and that friction should not be generated along the side of motorways and arterial expressways by the release of lands for residential and other uses that would create demands for direct access onto those road types. We note that WCC and PCC are already making progress on this issue. Their final submissions to this Sub-committee showed that they recognised the importance of integrated land use and transportation planning. They recognise that the development of new inter-Regional roads should not become the catalyst for urban sprawl. This must be easier to achieve for a new route through 'greenfields' sites, where appropriate rules can be written prior to development. It is the responsibility of local authorities in the Region, individually and collectively, to prevent sprawl through an agreed approach to land use.
- 3.26 The Sub-committee is persuaded that a longer term horizon than 10 years is required to address major unusual and strategic land transport issues. The views of Land Transport NZ are helpful in this regard and require to be understood as individual projects within the Corridor Plan are put forward for funding. The Sub-committee is also persuaded that resilience must be valued and that TGM should not be assumed to be unfundable because of its BCR. With regard to the latter we note the following advice from Land Transport NZ:

"Land Transport New Zealand has no general policy that prevents funding of activities with Benefit/Cost Ratios of less than 1."

- 3.27 The Sub-committee itself has pondered how to approach the problem of assessing the strategic merit of different options and in particular the extent to which funding availability becomes, in the final estimation, the deciding issue in strategic decisions. We have been aware of the desire of submitters that we should not reduce the assessment of strategic merit simply to a matter of funding availability. We agree that this is neither desirable nor consistent with the LTA. At the same time, the Sub-committee believes that making a strategic decision does require the Region to consider the issue of funding.
- 3.28 We do not interpret the LTA as requiring the Region in developing its RLTS to be restricted to a 10 year vision. Nor do we consider that Parliament intended that the Region or any agency interpret the words '*funding likely to be available*' to mean only the 'guaranteed' funding from national sources. We accept the view expressed by Land Transport NZ that a Regional view needs to be developed beyond 20 to 30 years for investment in long-term, strategic and expensive infrastructure. We have kept this advice in mind during our deliberations and in coming to our findings and conclusions about appropriate amendments to the proposed WCP.

Public Views on Responsibility for Funding

- Submitter's Views**
- 3.29 A number of submitters (e.g. Pauatahanui Residents' Association) were critical of the suggestion in the consultation document that, in the event that TGM was the selected option, the indicative shortfall in funding should come from rates. They were particularly critical of the "rates calculator" which appeared on GW's website which they considered was an attempt to influence the consultation process against TGM.
- 3.30 Submitters pointed to the provisions of S.67 of the Transit New Zealand Act 1989 whereby S.67(1) provides that ". . . *the whole of the cost of construction and maintenance of the carriageway of any State highway . . . shall from the date of the designation of the State highway be provided by the Authority . . .*". In this context 'designation' does not refer to the meaning under the RMA but the 'declaration' of State Highway status to a route by Transit.
- 3.31 It was suggested that Transit was incorrectly attempting to apply the provisions of S.67(2) of the Transit New Zealand Act 1989 that to seek a contribution from the territorial authorities for higher standards "*in respect of any State highway*" to justify seeking funding from territorial authorities for the differential cost of TGM on the grounds that it was a "*higher standard*". Transit officials agreed that the cost of carriage-way construction of TGM was, in fact, lower than the Coastal Route.
- 3.32 It was also noted that the provisions of S.81(1) of the above that, in respect of funding the cost of motorways, provided that "*no local authority shall be required to contribute to the cost of any motorway*". The concern expressed was that Transit would endeavour to circumvent these provisions by re-designating TGM as an "expressway".
- Sub-committee's Response**
- 3.33 The Sub-committee considers that S.81(1) does not preclude the possibility of territorial authorities agreeing to contribute to the cost of TGM, but in order to do so they would need to meet the requirements of the LGA and make provision for any contributions in their long-term council community plans and funding policies.
- 3.34 The Sub-committee also notes that while submitters tended to be of the view that the funding of SH1 and motorways should be for central government, they were prepared to contribute to that funding by way of tolls or in some other form. For example, the UMR Survey undertaken for TGAG noted that a majority (52%) of residents would be willing to pay a \$3 toll, while (27%) indicated either mild or strong unwillingness to use

the road if they had to pay a toll (19% were neutral towards the toll). A number of submitters also expressed a willingness to pay a toll, and the Project Team's public survey also indicated that "*most residents were prepared to pay to complete the central section via Transmission Gully*" (p21).

Evidential Base of the Proposed WCP

Submitter's Views

- 3.35 There was extensive criticism of the data used for the traffic modelling, the credibility of the costings of capital expenditure for TGM and the Coastal Route respectively, and the PBS.
- 3.36 With regard to the traffic modelling, submitters expressed concern at the use of average vehicle volume measures, the restriction of the modelling to week day volumes, the lack of data related to origin and destination, and the lack of data on the causes, incidence and impact of road closures on the Coastal Route and other roads such as the Paekakariki Hill Road and the Akatarawa Road. There was also scepticism about forecasted projections, with Paremata Residents' Association pointing out that actual recorded 2-hour peak vehicle use on State Highway 58, the Paekakariki Hill Road and Grays Road already exceeded forecast volumes for 2016. Particular concern was expressed around the use of unrevised population projections (see submitter 2031).
- 3.37 It is clear that the regional modelling provides an essential predictive tool, especially around the major flows (multi-modal, peak commute, north-south) that are normally the subject of most concern. It is also clear that the usefulness is diminished when other flows (e.g. interpeak and weekend, or east-west) are being considered too, as is the case here. In these situations it is important to supplement strategic modelling with more local and actual data. Of course the local data will be limited too, in that it is a good counter but a poor predictor of behaviour in a multi-modal or congested network. One of the problems unearthed in this process was a disconnect between strategic and local modelling, leading to a great deal of unnecessary confusion amongst affected communities. Modelling is an important tool to aid transport planning. Given that the construct of the RLTS requires communication between the involved transport agencies, it is vital that mechanisms are developed to ensure the required communication takes place, and a robust modelling capacity is established. The establishment of this capacity should be a matter of priority given the significant transport issues that still remain.
- 3.38 There was considerable scepticism regarding the estimates of capital costs. Many submitters objected to the costs for the Coastal Route in the consultation document being the 50th percentile cost estimate and the TGM cost being the 95th percentile cost estimate. There was also a widespread view that the costs of the Coastal Route Upgrade were likely to increase relative to the TGM because of the former were based on significantly less certain information about the consentability and buildability of the Coastal Route proposals in comparison with the TGM.
- 3.39 We received numerous submissions suggesting that the Coastal Route Upgrade cost estimates did not take into account:
- the difficulties of building the Coastal Expressway and Pukerua Bay Bypass with their myriad of geological challenges
 - the costs of securing the route against natural disaster
 - the costs of mitigating significant environmental and community impacts.
- 3.40 Submitters occasionally noted that particular 'line-items' in the technical papers underpinning the proposed WCP appeared to lack credibility. In particular, submitters suggested that the compensatory and mitigation costs for the proposed Mana and

Pukerua Bay Bypasses respectively were unrealistically low. A number of submitters also noted that costs already identified with separate funding had been included in the TGM costing, thus inflating the latter and the extent of the gap vis a vis available funding. Finally, some submitters questioned the designs on which TGM has been costed, with some suggesting what they saw as lower cost options such as a two-lane TGM road. Others suggested that TGM costs could be reduced by reducing the number of interchanges currently included in the plan.

- 3.41 Like the estimates of capital costs, the PBS was subject to considerable analysis and critique. While most submitters recognised the importance of measuring the parameters set out in the PBS, very few submitters were satisfied with the weightings given to those parameters, the indicators and measures used, and the comparative assessments of the likely performance of the options.
- 3.42 With regard to weighting, Land Transport NZ rejected claims in the technical papers and the implication in the consultation document that it had approved a weighting system of 20 percent on each of the LTMA objectives. Land Transport NZ also suggested that the PBS failed to deal with the critical issue of travel time reliability. Numerous submitters suggested that the measures used in the PBS were not comprehensive and failed to implement international best practice and research on the impacts of roading decisions on individuals, families and communities.
- 3.43 Significant international research on the impacts and the appropriate measurement of noise, health and community severance was presented by submitters. The Project Team advises us that while they undertook international peer review of the PBS, they had undertaken no systematic review of relevant international research or practice prior to developing the PBS applied in this case.
- 3.44 Most submitters stated that they believed that scores resulting from the application of PBS indicators and measures were not credible. Some submitters, such as 5466, saw this as arising from systemic flaws in the PBS and others saw it as arising from inadequate information. Many submitters noted the lack of transparency about the data used to 'drive' the PBS scoring and submitters 479, 3257, 3704 and 4731 provided alternative scores with accompanying rationale. Overall, submitters believed that the PBS significantly underestimated the negative impacts of both the Coastal Route projects and the Petone-Grenada Link Road proposal and overestimated their benefits. Conversely, many submitters also believed that the PBS scoring overstated the negative impacts of TGM and underestimated its benefits.
- 3.45 A number of specific criticisms were made about the structure of the PBS which submitters suggested would lead the PBS to minimise the difference between the critical strategic options of the Coastal Route and the TGM respectively. Those are:
 - Failure to account for the benefits for economic growth and GDP associated with earlier completion of the TGM relative to the 24 years delay until the full Coastal Route Upgrade improvements are achieved.
 - Inadequate calculation of the GDP impacts of TGM relative to the Coastal Route Upgrade due to assumptions around lending for TGM.
 - Failure to account for the personal, economic and productivity costs of travel delays associated with on-going construction on the Coastal Route for a period of up to 24 years.
 - Over-weighting the impacts of the capital cost by including them in three different line items of the PBS including both the measure of economic efficiency and affordability which were given the highest weighting by the Project Team.
 - Under accounting of roading network resilience.

- Inadequate measures of access and safety.
- Inadequate measures of community severance.
- Inadequate measures of noise impacts.
- Inadequate measures of cultural and heritage impacts.
- Inadequate recognition of the ecological and amenity values of the coast.
- Inadequate recognition of health impacts.
- Inadequate conceptualisation and measurement of affordability and economic efficiency.
- A tendency to reduce the impacts of critical indicators through averaging through using a proliferation of indicators in some performance areas while using only a small number of indicators in performance areas seen as favouring the Coastal Route Upgrade.

Sub-committee's Response

- 3.46 The comments of submitters regarding the fragility of the evidential and analytic base underpinning decisions around the proposed WCP are well understood by the Sub-committee. Some of the uncertainties around costings are inevitable given that all the costings on all projects are estimates. Moreover, they are estimates on concepts not on fully designed options.
- 3.47 It is unfortunate that there has been some duplication of costs included in the costings around TGM. While those have now been rectified, those have fed into a widespread public perception that the costings have been manipulated in order to promote the Coastal Route. We can only point out that the Project Team has acknowledged that problem of duplication to the Sub-committee and have provided the Sub-committee with a cost estimate for TGM that excludes those duplications.
- 3.48 Given the uncertainties around costing which must inevitably be associated with making strategic decisions prior to designing specific options, we believe that it is prudent to take a conservative approach to cost estimates at this stage. The Sub-committee has developed its findings in regard to the WCP using the 95th percentile cost estimate for TGM provided to us. We note that the cost estimates for the Coastal Route Upgrade are also uncertain and we believe that the costs of mitigation and the processes of consenting are likely to be expensive and difficult to predict.
- 3.49 Overall, then, the Sub-committee has considered submissions in the light of the information made available during the consultation phase. It is unable to determine whether TGM will, as a whole, cost more than the Coastal Route Upgrade, although we note that the Project Team has advised us that on a per kilometre basis, TGM is cheaper than the Coastal Route Upgrade.
- 3.50 With regard to the PBS, we find on the basis of the evidence, that the PBS in its current form does overstate the benefits and understate the negative impacts of the proposals for the Coastal Route Upgrade relative to the TGM package. The PBS analysis generated in relation to the HE 6 and HE 6 Variants for the Petone-Grenada Link Road also appears to be similarly distorted.
- 3.51 As far as the weightings are concerned, the Sub-committee notes that the Project Team assembled to prepare the WCP weighted the five domains or factors set out in S.175 (2) (b) of the LTA. The Project Team also included a domain which measured economic efficiency and affordability in response to S.175 (2) (c) of the LTA and sought the views of others on the weighting of all the factors. There emerged a range of different approaches to weighting.

- 3.52 The Sub-committee sought independent legal advice on both issues and came to the view that the appropriate approach was:
- to consider both the statutory factors and any other factors considered to be relevant; and
 - when weighting the factors identified in the PBS, the decision makers can accord such weighting as in their judgement is justified.
- 3.53 There are lessons around the development and application of a PBS methodology that need to be learned:
- First, the consultation document, while suggesting that the PBS constitutes only an aid to decision-making, gives the clear impression that the PBS has been a vital element in the selection of the Coastal Route Upgrade and the movement away from TGM. If this is not the case, then clear communication about the place of any PBS in the selection of strategic preferences is needed now and will be in the future.
 - Secondly, it is clear that the PBS is inadequate to address the problem of the sort of strategic decision needed in the context of a Corridor plan. This is particularly true when assessing the strategic merits of the Coastal Route Upgrade relative to the TGM.
- 3.54 The current PBS indicators and measures may have proved appropriate if used to distinguish between alternative design options after the prior selection of the desirable strategic option. Although it must be said that under those circumstances one would expect a full environmental audit and social impact assessment. The evidence presented to us shows that the indicators and measures used in the PBS do not encompass the range of impacts and benefits that need to be considered on the relative merits and impacts of each of the projects in the WCP at the strategic level. In short, the PBS does not provide a means by which the full set of factors required to be considered under the LTA can be measured.

4 Submitter Views & the Sub-committee Response: Key Components of the Plan

Introduction

- 4.1 The submissions provide strong and consistent statements about the relative merits, benefits and impacts of the various projects and key elements of the proposed WCP. Building from the more general discussion in Section 3 about decision-making and the evidential base, this section sets out issues raised by submitters on key components of the proposed WCP, along with the Sub-committee's response.

Coastal Route Upgrade vs. TGM

- Submitter's Views**
- 4.2 To most submitters the choice was clear. Most submitters on the subject find the Coastal Route proposals utterly unacceptable. A similarly high proportion of submitters on the subject (82 percent) want the TGM option to be implemented. Reinforcing and similar results can be found in the survey commissioned by the Project Team jointly made up of Transit and Greater Wellington. Those results are also consistent with the results of a survey commissioned by the TGM Action Group (TGAG), as shown in Table 2 and Table 3 below.
- 4.3 The analysis of written submissions shows that 96.3% opposed the Coastal Route Upgrade. 82.6% of written submissions supported TGM. The small proportion of written submissions supporting the Coastal Route Upgrade reflects a regional perspective. For instance, among the written submissions from Wellington, only 3.6% supported the Coastal Route Upgrade. Similarly 2.1% of written submissions from Porirua supported the Coastal Route Upgrade, whilst 7.1% of written submissions from the Kapiti Coast supported the Coastal Route Upgrade. On a locality basis, written submissions from Horowhenua showed the highest proportion of support for the Coastal Route Upgrade, with 7 of 27 (25.9%) supporting the Coastal Route Upgrade.
- 4.4 The support for TGM also showed that, irrespective of location, it was the preferred option to a significant extent. 81.7% of written submissions from Wellington City supported TGM. Among written submissions from Porirua, 85.4% supported TGM. Among the written submissions from the Kapiti Coast, 90.2% supported TGM. 88.9% of written submissions from Horowhenua supported TGM.
- 4.5 In calculating these figures, some submitters expressed support for both the Coastal Route Upgrade and for TGM. The proportions above have been calculated on the basis of the total support expressed for each of the options. Consequently, the combined support from some particular localities exceeds 100%.

Table 2: Project Team Public Opinion Survey

WCP Public Opinion Survey			
	Support CR	Support TGM	Don't know or not stated
	%	%	%
Total	13	65	22
Wellington	12	65	23
Porirua	5	81	14
Hutt	16	63	21
Upper Hutt	9	66	25
Wairarapa	26	39	35
Kapiti	12	76	12

Table 3: TGM Action Group Survey Results

TGAG Survey						
Location	Support CR upgrade		Support TGM		Unsure	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Total	63	21	207	69	30	10
Wellington	34.5	23	94.5	63	21	14
Porirua	0.76	2	34.58	91	2.66	7
Hutt	20.25	25	54.27	67	6.48	8
Upper Hutt	8.06	26	22.32	72	0.62	2

- 4.6 Three aspects of the public response to the Coastal Route Upgrade are particularly striking. First, the public response represents a very real Regional consensus. Irrespective of where submitters and survey participants lived in the Region, support for TGM and antipathy to the Coastal Route Upgrade was high. There is no evidence here, that opposition to the Coastal Route Upgrade is merely a case of NIMBYism. There is Region-wide antipathy to the Coastal Route Upgrade and Region-wide support for a TGM. Of the written submissions which opposed the Coastal Route Upgrade, 49% cited adverse environmental effects, 45% adverse community effects, and 34% buildability, as reasons.
- 4.7 The second striking aspect of submissions on the Coastal Route Upgrade is the widespread view that both the costings of the proposals for the Coastal Route Upgrade are considered by submitters as, at best, inadequate and unrealistic and, at worst, misleading and systematically biased. Submitters frequently stated that they believed that problems of consent and the cost of mitigation, problems of buildability associated with the fragility of the coastal environment and the extent of reclamation, combined with the significant compensation associated with the loss of property and amenity in the affected communities would mean that the coastal option would, finally, be at least as expensive as a TGM.

- 4.8 The published figures on costings were not considered accurate by most submitters, in part because of a perception that the cost estimates were directed to establishing a lower comparative cost for the Coastal Route Upgrade proposals and a higher costing for TGM. This view was based on requirements such as the upgrading of Grays Road (\$60 million) not being identified as a cost associated with the Coastal Route Upgrade when submitters argued such as the Grays Road upgrade would be vital if the Coastal Route Upgrade proposals went ahead.
- 4.9 A number of submitters suggested means by which the cost of constructing TGM might be reduced. Those options included: two or three laning rather than a four-lane TGM; staging construction, and changing the numerous interchanges currently included in the TGM costing. Several submitters from the Whitby area suggested that the proposed James Cook Drive interchange was not needed. PCC also identified that the James Cook Drive interchange was the least necessary of the interchanges included in the current costing package.
- 4.10 The third striking aspect of the submissions was the widely stated rejection of the view that TGM was unaffordable. Most submitters considered TGM to be both a superior option and better value for money. The Coastal Route proposals were seen as a second-rate option, providing, at best, an interim solution. Many submitters, most notably the Paremata Residents' Association, referred to various statements by Transit, including in proceedings in the Environment Court to which they were a party, that TGM was the preferred option and considered to be necessary in the longer term. Under those circumstances, submitters questioned why communities and road users should be required to face burdensome and costly on-going traffic disruption with the Coastal Route Upgrade as well as its uncertainties and risks around construction costs. Submitters saw the early adoption of TGM as the best long term solution offering local communities, the Region and the nation considerable long term benefits for which funding should be found.
- 4.11 The consistent and irresistible impression from the submissions is that the Coastal Route Upgrade is seen as providing only short-term relief from current problems. Indeed, because of the 24 years the Coastal Route Upgrade is projected to take to complete, it is seen as exacerbating the following set of persistent problems:
- Problems with the resilience of the road and rail access to and from the capital city.
 - Persistently unpredictable and unreliable travel times along the current State Highway network for both intra-regional and national traffic.
 - Poor connectivity with the Hutt Valley.
 - Inappropriate mixing of local, intra-regional and national traffic on the road which is currently SH1, on SH58 and Grays Road.
 - Ongoing construction delays generated out of futile attempts to resolve capacity problems on existing roads through fragile topography and through valued local communities.
- 4.12 The failure to address those problems in the past is seen by submitters as reflecting poorly on local and central government decision makers and agencies. Submitters identified the building of TGM as critical to:
- maintaining the integrity of the national transport network
 - reaping the economic potential of the port and the airport
 - reducing the costs to people and businesses of currently unpredictable travel times
 - preserving the historical character of the coastal communities adjacent to SH1
 - increasing the economic potential of the Region and growing its productivity.

- 4.13 Many submitters saw TGM as restoring and strengthening local communities including improving health and safety outcomes, protecting nationally and regionally important environments and amenities, recognising Māori interests and concerns, and, finally, ensuring that regional facilities such as hospitals are readily accessible to all the people in the Region who rely on them. Submitters argued that those benefits of TGM should have been uppermost when considering the relative merits of different options in the context of statutory criteria applicable to a land transport corridor plan.
- 4.14 For the submitters who favoured the Coastal Route Upgrade, affordability and buildability were key factors. The Coastal Route Upgrade offered:
- An opportunity to incrementally upgrade SH1 and, thereby, gain benefits around decreased SH1 congestion and improved travel reliability.
 - A cheaper option to improve SH1 for which funding was available.
 - An opportunity to make interim improvements while waiting for TGM to be funded and built in the future and if required.
 - The ability to build on the capacity and previous investment in the current highway.
 - A buildable option compared with the territory of TGM.
- 4.15 WCC was particularly concerned that the additional resources that would be consumed with the construction of TGM would prejudice other transport projects in the Region with higher BCRs. WCC was also concerned with the impact on urban form, and in particular the risks of urban sprawl if TGM was constructed.
- 4.16 Supporters of the Coastal Route Upgrade submitted that mitigation measures could be undertaken to alleviate the negative environmental and social aspects of the Coastal Route Upgrade proposals. They acknowledged that, in particular, the three projects that constitute the Coastal Route Upgrade would impact negatively on the coastal communities, but believed that individuals affected would be compensated adequately, that the incursion into the coast and into coastal communities would, in any case, be small, and that those living in coastal communities adjacent to SH1 were aware of the risks of, and consequently should adapt to any negative impacts of, state highway improvement.
- 4.17 Those in favour of TGM frequently saw the proposal for the Coastal Route Upgrade as a betrayal of local communities by public agencies. They believed the promotion of the Coastal Route Upgrade as a refusal on the part of those agencies to acknowledge the well-established environmental, cultural and social values of the coast and its coastal communities.
- 4.18 Submitters provided evidence to show that there have been commitments made by Transit, and actions which appear to support those commitments, that TGM is the long-term preferred route for SH1 and that the Coastal Route would not be considered for further upgrade. One submitter commented that the real conflict could be summed up by the words "*either Transmission Gully now, or Transmission Gully later*". All those submitters believe that the commitment to TGM were represented in:
- Transit's evidence to the Environment Court.
 - The Environment Court ruling in 2001.
 - The heads of agreement between Transit and Porirua City Council.
 - The public statements of Transit.
 - The lifting of the designations at Pukerua Bay for the proposed Bypass in 1988.
 - The designation and purchase of land for TGM and associated planting for the mitigation of impacts around the construction of TGM.
 - Transit not objecting to resource consents for developments on land now significantly affected by the proposal for the Coastal Expressway in the WCP.

- 4.19 A high proportion of submitters consistently expressed concern that Centennial Highway is susceptible to closure or compromise and were concerned about the reliability of the State Highway network leading to and from the Capital City. Submitters cited relatively short-term disruptions arising from vehicle accidents, severe weather events, natural incidents such as landslides, and longer term closures. The vulnerability of all major routes and alternatives, such as TGM, was stressed by 26% of written submissions and a majority of those presenting to the Sub-committee. In such circumstances the loss of road access to Wellington and probable loss of airport and port facilities was considered a serious risk for communities and for the Regional economy.
- 4.20 It was argued by many submitters that TGM would enhance the resilience of the road network. For the short-term, and reasonably frequent, disruptions of the Coastal Route, TGM offers a bypass. In respect of major disaster events, submitters argued that TGM would be less vulnerable than the Coastal Route and be faster to restore. Submissions were made by several geologists, including Dr Graeme Stevens (submission 465), concerning the potential instability of the escarpment above Centennial Highway between Pukerua Bay and Paekakariki.
- 4.21 The Wellington Lifelines Group, a network of representatives of the major lifeline utilities, including territorial authorities, utilities agencies, engineering consultants of which Transit Wellington is member although not involved in submission, submitted that reinstatement of land transport access following a major natural hazard event must be a factor in assessing the merits of the proposed WCP. The Wellington Lifelines Group advised that the scale of disruption caused by a natural disaster across all transport networks, and consequent social and economic impacts, are much greater than generally appreciated. This was illustrated by reference to effects on the main highway routes leading to Wellington from a M7.5 Wellington fault earthquake (see Annex 6), and Table 4.
- 4.22 Under those conditions, the Coastal Route is likely to sustain landslides along the full length of the route from Pukerua Bay to Paekakariki, liquefaction along sections between Porirua and Pukerua Bay and tsunami inundation along all exposed coastal portions of the route. TGM is also susceptible to landslides in some sections of its route.
- 4.23 Using a risk analysis approach, the Wellington Lifelines Group provided an indication of the timeframes necessary to restore 'basic access' following such an earthquake event. That table is presented below. The highest level of risk (no alternative routes/months to restore access) applies to the current SH1 sections of:
- Pukerua Bay to Paekakariki
 - Wellington to Ngauranga.

Table 4: Time to restore basic access following a Wellington fault event⁴

Main highway routes		Open to some traffic – eg. one lane only, speed restricted
1	Airport to Wellington City	Yellow
2	Wellington to Ngauranga (SH 1)	Magenta
3	Ngauranga Gorge to Johnsonville	Orange
3a	Johnsonville to Porirua (SH 1)	Yellow
3b	Porirua to Paremata (SH 1)	Orange
4a	Ngauranga to Lower Hutt (SH 2)	Magenta
4b	Lower Hutt to Upper Hutt (SH 2)	Orange
5	Haywards to Porirua (SH 58)	Orange
6a	Paremata to Pukerua Bay (SH 1)	Orange
6b	Pukerua Bay to Paekakariki (SH 1)	Magenta
6c	Paekakariki to Waikanae (SH 1)	Orange
7	TGM (P)	Yellow
8a	Upper Hutt to Featherston (SH 2)	Magenta
8b	Featherston to Woodville (SH 2)	Yellow
9	Manawatu Gorge (SH 3)	Orange
10	Palmerston North to Waikanae	Orange
11	Grays Road (link)	Orange
12	Paekakariki Hill Road	Magenta
13	Churchill Drive	Yellow
14	Akatarawa Hill Road	Magenta
<i>Route and route numbers as shown on preceding figure</i>		

Key

Characterising the task (given the likely physical impacts)	Broad time frames	Colour
Moderate resource demand/alternative routes exist	Within a week	Yellow
High resource demand/limited alternative routes	After several weeks	Orange
Extreme resource demand/no alternative routes	Months	Magenta

⁴ Source: Wellington Lifelines Group, Presentation to the Sub-committee, Tuesday 7 February 2006.

See also Paragraph 4.50 of this Report.

- 4.24 By comparison, basic, but more than simply emergency, access along a TGM would be capable of being restored within one week. In the view of the Wellington Lifelines Group, TGM would be the only main route likely to provide basic access to Wellington within a week of a severe earthquake event. Churchill Drive, which has a similar low level of risk would allow the Ngauranga to Wellington Section of SH1 to be bypassed. Other submitters identified the significant difficulties of maintaining supplies of food to the Region and, in particular, Wellington City because major warehousing was in Palmerston North and there was less than a week's supply of food in Wellington.
- 4.25 Dr Graham Ramsey of Beca Infrastructure made a submission on behalf of Transit on his assessment of the relative risks to the Coastal Route and TGM. He concluded that the probable frequency of events which would induce large road closing landslides was very low. In such an event, however, large landslides could be expected on Centennial Highway between Pukerua Bay and Paekakariki, but that restoration of access for emergency vehicles was likely to be of the order of weeks not months. He agreed, however that basic restoration of transport such as envisaged by the Wellington Lifeline Group would take longer. Dr Ramsey stated:
- "the likelihood is that slope failure on the Coastal Route would be greater than on the current TGM design."*
- He also stated to the Sub-committee that on the Centennial Highway
- "The application of slope stabilisation works to reduce the susceptibility of the slopes to earthquake induced landslides is not considered practical or economically justifiable, even if it were possible to positively identify which slopes required treatment."*
- 4.26 Dr Ramsey then concluded that *"the current TGM design is likely to be less susceptible to closure during the extreme events that will close the Coastal Route."* The Project Team however noted that bridges which are part of the TGM route could take longer to repair if damaged than the Coastal Route which is largely without bridges.
- 4.27 Many submitters highlighted the regular disruption on Centennial Highway due to waves overtopping the seawall, traffic accidents and rock falls. It was claimed by many that significant delays were a regular feature of the Coastal Route. Several submitters argued that these incidents would be more frequent with the prospect of rising sea levels and weather patterns giving rise to more frequent storm surge events. While no systematic quantitative data was provided on disruption to the Coastal Route, the Sub-committee concluded from submissions that the current pattern of disruption could be once per month.
- 4.28 Submitters expressed doubt about the buildability of the Coastal Route Upgrade, particularly the projects that constitute the Coastal Expressway, given the unstable nature of the landscape through which SH1 passes and the high escarpments which would be required North of Pukerua Bay.
- 4.29 Road transport interests advised us that the long-haul heavy vehicle operators want an efficient and secure arterial route to Wellington and the South Island. Several submitters suggested that the steep grades on TGM would deter heavy vehicle use of it. Road transport interests advised us that this would not be the case for most heavy vehicles, although the small proportion of over-dimensional loads would probably have a preference for the Coastal Route, during periods of low traffic volumes. The Central Area of the Road Transport Association (submission 3984) expressed a clear preference for TGM. The Road Transport Forum indicated a preference for the Coastal Route Upgrade on the basis of the cost differential and a desire to expedite a solution, but if TGM was built, and the existing Coastal Route became a local road, operators would use TGM.

- 4.30 Submitters also raised significant cultural issues that would need to be addressed if the Coastal Route Upgrade was to be pursued. Few submitters believed that the cultural impacts of the coastal highway at any of the sections – Pukerua Bay, Centennial Highway or Mana – could be adequately mitigated. Submitters enumerated a considerable list of cultural, heritage and amenities that would be affected from schools, playing fields, marinas, historic sites, traditional fishing grounds and urupa. TGM by way of contrast was seen as relatively unencumbered by significant sites and amenities.
- 4.31 Ngati Toa had been asked by the Project Team to advise on the cultural impacts of the proposed WCP, particularly the proposals on the Coastal Route. That advice was presented to the Sub-committee by Te Runanga o Ngati Toa Rangatira. They oppose any reclamation of the coastline along Centennial Highway due to the negative effects this will have on the natural coastal environment. They also express concern that the Coastal Route will adversely affect sites of cultural importance, including traditional food gathering, sacred, and ancestral sites. Harbour Side Park is of particular importance as it is land that could be part of Treaty of Waitangi settlement negotiations with the Crown. Ngati Toa support the earliest possible construction of TGM. While noting that there are potential adverse environmental effects associated with construction of TGM, these were seen as of a smaller degree than those created by the Coastal Route proposals. They submitted that there are no sites of cultural significance directly affected by the planned TGM. The representatives of Ngati Toa stated quite categorically that they would actively oppose Transit applications for designations and consents on the proposed Coastal Route Upgrades.
- 4.32 Nearly half of all written submissions brought to our attention what they saw as profound negative impacts of the Coastal Expressway and other proposed upgrades on local settlements of Mana, Paremata, Camborne, Plimmerton, Pukerua Bay and Paekakariki. Those communities were valued by submitters, characterised as having a strong sense of attachment and social capital, places that attract and keep skills in New Zealand, and communities in which children and young people can grow up well, and older people can age in place. Most submitters stated that the character, identity and functionality of those communities would be altered beyond recognition. Existing communities would become separated from themselves by multiple lanes of high volume, high speed traffic. They would be separated from the coast and beaches that give them their particular appeal and iconic nature, and the community amenities that they have collectively built over many generations would be destroyed, distanced or detached. Submitters concerned with the impacts of the Coastal Route Upgrade proposals expressed anxiety about both the impact of the Mana Bypass on South Beach and the impact of access and exit ramps on Plimmerton Village and School.
- 4.33 Particular concern was expressed by submitters on the impact of the Coastal Route Upgrade on children, young people and the elderly. People in the local communities noted the loss of facilities and amenities that would affect the Wellington Region as a whole. The loss of playing fields and clubrooms was brought to the attention of the Sub-committee, as was the difficulty of finding alternative sites. Particularly important were submissions made by the Mana Cruising Club, the Paremata-Plimmerton Rugby Club and the Mana Squash Club, all directly impacted by the Bypass proposal. A submitter noted that the local pony club had already been displaced by the work on the Mana Expressway and had, consequently, ceased to function. Submitters, including representatives from a local school (submitter 2922) and an expert on noise impacts, noted that schools and learning would be significantly affected. A number of young adults, children and the elderly submitted that their independence would be destroyed.

- 4.34 Numerous highly skilled people who had come to live in New Zealand submitted that they had been attracted to New Zealand and the Wellington Region in particular because of the attractions of the coastal communities. They said they would reconsider their position in New Zealand if the proposals for any of the Coastal Route proceeded. It was notable that a young man born and bred in Plimmerton and a Stanford graduate submitted that if this proposal went ahead he might as well live overseas. He represented a wider voice.
- 4.35 Submitters impressed upon the Sub-committee that the coastline and the coastal villages along it are a resource for the Wellington Region and in some cases the nation. Experts in marine ecology, notably submitter 1849, reported the unique nature of the Pauatahanui Inlet and its vulnerability to changes at the Paremata Bridge as well as to changes on Grays Road. They demonstrated the negative impact of previous reclamation around Goat Point and argued that the marine life on the inter-tidal area along Centennial Highway is only now being restored after the building of the present coastal encroachments some seventy years ago. Other submitters identified important aspects of the systems at South Beach that made South Beach a uniquely safe beach in the Region and gave it an international reputation among windsurfers. Several submitters including but not only Ngati Toa and Te Ati Awa ki Whakarongotai noted the unique mussel beds along the coast adjacent to the Centennial Highway in the area and their cultural as well as ecological importance.
- 4.36 Submitters consistently rejected the PBS assessment of environmental, cultural, economic and social impacts of the Coastal Route proposals as uninformed, unrealistic and simply not credible. A submission from the Plimmerton Residents' Association (5287) catalogued the various impacts and assessed them against criteria in the Act. Submitters identified significant differences between the assessments of impacts by the Peer Reviewers and assessments accepted by the Project Team. They also identified significant differences between these and assessments contained in previous reports on the consentability and merits of upgrading the Coastal Route including previous proposals for a bypass at Pukerua Bay and various roading proposals around Mana, Camborne, and Paremata. Submitters, including those directly affected as householders, those who live in the coastal communities, and those from elsewhere within the Wellington Region who use the amenities and have an affinity with that coastal environment expressed distress around the Coastal Route Upgrade proposals. They believed the proposals to be ultimately non-consentable and expressed considerable determination to oppose applications for designations and consents.
- 4.37 The residents of the coastal communities were very concerned that they would be seen as 'NIMBYists' attempting to impose the costs of TGM on the rest of the Region. Certainly a few submitters supporting the Coastal Route suggested that it was not legitimate for residents in the communities along the coastal highway to resist its transformation into a four-lane expressway, essentially because those residents were seen to have chosen to live near a state highway.
- 4.38 Submitters from local communities pointed out, however, that for the communities of Mana, Plimmerton, Paremata and Pukerua Bay, the SH1 came to them rather than the other way around. Many of the submitters from those areas had lived in the area all their lives. Many local submitters are third or fourth generation. They demonstrated that their attachment to those communities stretched back to when the road from Pukerua Bay, the road past the villages of Plimmerton and Mana and across the Paremata Bridge was developed as a local road. Submitters gave evidence that the residents of Mana, Plimmerton and Paremata contributed to the funding of the Paremata Bridge through a special levy on their rates right up until 1972. Those submitters pointed out that that local initiative and that locally sourced funding meant

the Centennial Highway could be built in the late 1930s and, by extension, those local communities have contributed directly to the state highway network that has served the nation and the Region for almost half a century.

4.39 Submitters also expressed bemusement about why Transit and GW would choose to promote a Coastal Route Upgrade that would involve continuous interruption to road users over 25 years as incremental upgrades were undertaken. Submitters pointed out that TGM could be built on a greenfields site without interfering with people carrying out their daily business and without the disruption of road freight. They suggested that TGM also shows much more certainty around costing and consentability. Submitters suggested that there are opportunities to reduce costs through international contracting and that freight and through traffic would use that route.

4.40 Of particular concern to submitters was what they perceived to be a distorted view of the economics of TGM relative to the Coastal Route. Dr Dennis Rose argued in submission 5972 that the contribution of TGM to GDP had been significantly under-estimated. After presenting a clear account of his assumptions and calculations, Dr Rose states:

"The contribution to GDP from transport savings is very much the same for the two scenarios [Coastal Route package FP31 and TGM package FP33]. The contribution to GDP arising from construction costs is greater for TGM. The sum of these two elements, the only two factors identified in the body of the PBS text as contributing to PBS changes to GDP scores, thus favours the Gully rather than the Coast".

4.41 According to Dr Rose, the apparent merits of the Coastal Route over TGM in the PBS reflects the use of extreme assumptions about loan servicing in the GDP scoring and distortions arising from the PBS scoring the capital costs of each option to three different parts of the balance sheet.

4.42 There was also considerable concern expressed by submitters that TGM was seen as unaffordable because it, like many strategic, expensive infrastructural projects, presented a poor benefit-cost ratio (BCR). Both Professor Jackson in submission 5777 and Dr Rose made submissions on issues around the impact of discount rates. Both submitters noted that the application of discount rates prevailing in the United Kingdom (3.5% over 50 years) had a significant impact on the BCRs of both the Coastal Route Upgrade and TGM. That impact was evident using either the GW traffic model or Foster's model used by PCC with the BCR results ranging from 1.11 to 1.34 on the Coastal Route package, and from 0.92 to 1.83 on TGM package.

4.43 A group of submitters (318, 2031, 3740, 4747 for example) argued that the Coastal Route was now and could only continue to be a constraint on regional and national activity and growth. An interesting feature of submissions received was the very large number (over 200) from outside the region, nearly all of which opposed the Coastal Route Upgrade and supported TGM. Notable amongst these was a submission from the adjacent Regional Land Transport Committee, Manawatu-Wanganui, emphasising the national importance of efficient State Highway 1 connections between North and South Islands, and calling for an end to the inefficiencies they associated with the Coastal Route. Adjacent regions are entitled to but very rarely do comment on proposals in other regions, and the submission of Manawatu-Wanganui region is significant in this regard.

**Sub-
committee's
Response**

4.44 The Sub-committee is of the view that all of the components of the proposed Coastal Route Upgrade will have severe, possibly insurmountable, difficulties getting designations, consents and archaeological authorities separately and/or collectively. We see the time risk associated with obtaining any designations, consents, and archaeological authorities as very strong.

4.45 We have noted the high degree of concern and antipathy expressed by affected communities and stakeholders to each of the major projects involved in the proposed Coastal Route Upgrade. In our view, even if an attempt is made to get consents and even if that attempt is restricted to one project at a time, the likelihood of an extended period in the Courts, is very probable. The Supreme Court may become involved on the question of the statutory responsibilities of Transit and/or Land Transport NZ under the new statutory regime for land transport put in place by the LTMA and LTA. The recent legislation has not been tested in the Courts. This could be a very time consuming and expensive process.

4.46 The Sub-committee has concluded that the expectations of affected communities with regard to the Coastal Route and TGM cannot be ignored. Throughout the hearing of submissions the Sub-committee has heard strong criticism of Transit to the effect that it has breached earlier undertakings made regarding the interim improvements to SH1 through Mana/Paremata by now promoting the Coastal Route Upgrade. The Sub-committee has sought to identify the basis for this criticism, and has identified the following sequence of events.

Press Release An official press release from Transit of 5 January 2000 was tabled by several submitters which stated:

"Transit New Zealand (Transit) today confirmed the Transmission Gully Motorway (TGM) should proceed as soon as funds are available ...

...Transit will be discussing staging options to achieve urgently needed interim improvements to traffic flow through Mana/Paremata with the appellants to its clearways project.

... Transit has also confirmed its previous decision that it is committed to the construction of the TGM and will not be pursuing upgrading of the Coastal Route to four lanes. ..."(Emphasis added)

Memorandum of Agreement On 17 August 2000, Transit entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Wellington Regional Council and Porirua City Council to modify the scope of its proposed designation for the Mana/Paremata upgrade to a "Reduced Upgrade".

Heads of Agreement On 25 August 2000, Transit's Wellington Regional Manager, acting under authorisation, entered into a Heads of Agreement with Wellington Regional Council (WRC) and Porirua City Council (PCC), which provided as follows:

"Transit has informed PCC and WRC that it has made and intends to honour the following commitments to members of the local community:

(a) To demolish the existing Paremata Bridge and remove the Clearways through Mana in conjunction with the opening of TGM...

(b) To undertake a review ...of the operation of the Clearways, if TGM has not been constructed or its construction is not imminent by 2005."

Environment Court Proceedings The Environment Court hearing of appeals by Porirua City Council, A & F Middleton and others, TGM Action Council, Paremata Residents' Association Inc and Plimmerton Residents' Association Inc relating to the Mana/Paremata upgrade was held from 28 August until 1 September 2000. The evidence of Transit's Wellington Regional Manager (Dave Rendall) is of significance.

"14.1 It is my perception that much of the opposition to the proposal to upgrade the State Highway stems from a deep-seated belief by parts of

the local community that Transit will indefinitely delay construction of TGM if it is able to increase the capacity of the State Highway through Plimmerton/ Paremata.

14.2 *In order to allay those fears, I am authorised to make a number of commitments on Transit's behalf which it will honour, whether imposed as conditions of the requirement or not.*

*...As previously stated, **it is Transit's primary strategy to construct and operate TGM.** The measures suggested above, combined with the capacity limitations of the Reduced Upgrade, should provide adequate assurance of Transit's intentions to construct TGM as soon as funding is available, whatever the source of that funding may be."*

(This quote, attributed to Mr Rendall, was presented to the Sub-committee by the Paremata Residents' Association. We have not been able to verify its accuracy against the original Environment Court transcript.)

Environment Court Decision Transit's position was summarised by Judge Kernadine in the Environment Court's decision W 52/2001 as follows:

"[40] Transit's upgrade strategy for SH1 in the Wellington Region thus has both a long-term and a short-term focus, which can be summarised as follows:

- ***Transit's long-term preferred route for SH1** is what is known as the Inland Route, or "**TGM**" and its preferred project for this route is the TGM.*
- *The TGM may not be constructed for a number of years. Applying present funding criteria this may not be until 2015, although earlier construction could be possible, if legislative authority and funding can be secured.*
- *Transit has a strategy to address the existing congestion and safety issues on the present coastal SH1 corridor through targeted projects, but not in a way that would compromise the early construction of the TGM.*
- *..."*

(Emphasis added)

4.47 Given this sequence of events, the communities of Mana, Paremata, Camborne and Plimmerton, as well as the Porirua City Council had reasonable grounds to believe that the "Reduced Upgrade" was an interim project by Transit to address congestion. Transit's "Long-term preferred" solution was TGM. A four-lane Coastal Route Upgrade would never be promoted again by Transit and the Environment Court's decision precluded Transit from promoting such an option in the future.

4.48 The Sub-committee can, therefore, understand that, given such a sequence of events and statements by Transit, the currently proposed Coastal Route Upgrade is seen by many submitters as representing a major breach of faith by Transit and contrary to the spirit and intent of the order of the Environment Court in decision W52/2001. Furthermore, many submitters gave evidence that, acting on these statements, against that background, they had made significant economic investments in property and lifestyle choices. We are concerned that there was no clear evidence in the papers presented to us, of the RLTC or Cabinet having been explicitly advised of this background of assurances and undertakings when key decisions relating to the proposed WCP were taken during 2005.

4.49 Submitters are, in many cases, distressed that the Coastal Route Upgrade has been resurrected, causing personal anxiety and stress, and once again, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty for the communities when they thought the issue had been finally

resolved in 2001. The feeling of betrayal which was expressed vehemently to the Sub-committee is made all the more acute for the residents of the coastal communities because they, and the majority of other submitters, believe that the benefits of TGM are not being recognised and that decision-makers are ignoring the vulnerabilities and lack of resilience in the transport network and placing the Region's population and economy at risk.

- 4.50 On the basis of the submissions received from experts in the field, particularly the Wellington Lifelines Group, the Sub-committee has concluded that the Coastal Route is more susceptible to closure than TGM, particularly in an extreme hazard event such as an earthquake. TGM offers significant route security benefits under normal conditions and in the event of hazards. The Sub-committee also observes that, given the configuration of the arterial road network in the Wellington Region and potential hazards, it is necessary to provide several alternative routes if security of access is to be better assured. While this may result in some parts of the network experiencing under-utilisation, prudent risk management practice would suggest such an approach is highly desirable.
- 4.51 The Sub-committee has also noted the provisions of Transfund's (now Land Transport NZ's) Project Evaluation Manual which recognises security of access as a "national strategic factor" applicable to large roading projects,
- "Security of access is an important consideration where there are few (or no) reasonable alternatives to a particular route. There are benefits in providing a greater assurance to road users and communities that they will be able to depend on a particular route (such benefits can be expressed in a survey of road users' willingness to pay)."*
- 4.52 We note that the population of the Region has consistently expressed a willingness to pay something towards the cost of TGM through a user charge, most recently in a public survey undertaken over the consultation period.
- 4.53 We acknowledge the frustration of submitters regarding the uncertainties around cost-estimates. The Sub-committee does not see those uncertainties as unusual at this stage. In that, we are in agreement with the Treasury review. We do note, however, that the suspicion about cost estimates expressed by submitters reflects failures in communication with the public, and public agencies clearly have some work to do to restore credibility.
- 4.54 In particular, the public and the communities which will be directly affected by construction feel that, despite the new legislative environment, Transit, GW and some local authorities in the Wellington Region are not listening to them. They feel that Transit in particular believes that 'anything can be mitigated' and that there is no real commitment to understanding the existing social, cultural and environmental values.
- 4.55 The Sub-committee observes that part of the quality of life that the people of the Wellington Region clearly want is to be able to move quickly, safely and reliably to work, for business and to access health and other services. They also want, however, to be able to enjoy the amenities provided by the coast. They want to be able to walk, cycle and drive around their neighbourhoods, to shop, play, attend schools and be part of their communities without being overwhelmed by the sound, sight, vibration, volume and speed of freight and commuter through-traffic. In other areas, Transit has actively pursued the policy of bypassing local communities to allow the separation of local and arterial traffic. The people of the Wellington Region are asking for that approach to be applied for them by making the strategic decision to pursue TGM rather than the Coastal Expressway and many of the other proposed upgrades on the Coastal Route Upgrade.

- 4.56 The Sub-committee finds that Transit's practice of separating arterial from local traffic through bypassing local communities is sound and conforms to international best practice. TGM provides that opportunity. The Sub-committee observes that the proposal named the Mana Bypass hardly meets the principle of state highway separation from a local community that would allow the word 'bypass' to apply. The Sub-committee observes that the Coastal Incremental Upgrade runs counter to that approach.
- 4.57 It appears to the Sub-committee that what was a local initiative by the communities of Plimmerton and Mana to build and pay for a local bridge that subsequently became used for the State highway network has largely saved the Wellington Region and the nation from having to face up to the need for a dedicated SH1 connection into the Capital and beyond to the South Island for a very long time. The Sub-committee understands why submitters from those local communities expressed a desire that the expectation of a TGM be acted upon. It is understandable why submitters from those areas express a deep desire to have their local road back and a sense of deep hurt at being seen merely as NIMBYists who wish to be protected from their own imprudence.
- 4.58 In the Sub-committee's view the economics of the Coastal Route compared to TGM, are fairly evenly balanced. TGM may be a higher capital cost, but as the Project Team have acknowledged, the per kilometre cost is lower for TGM than the Coastal Highway proposals. However, the value-for-money and the consentability of the Coastal Route Upgrade must be questionable if, as we have been told by the Project Team, significant proportions of the cost estimates for the Coastal Route Upgrade proposals are reserved for mitigation, compensation payments and to fund the consenting processes.
- 4.59 The Sub-committee notes that TGM provides approximately 108 new lane kilometres (27 kilometres of four-lane highway) whilst retaining the existing Coastal Route as a local road and scenic highway. In contrast, the Coastal Route Upgrade provides approximately 44 new lane kilometres on the existing alignment (10 kilometres of new two-lane Coastal Expressway, 2 kilometres of four new lanes through Pukerua Bay, and 4 kilometres of new four-lane Mana Bypass). The Sub-committee therefore agrees with many of the submitters that TGM appears to provide much better value-for-money.
- 4.60 The profound nature of the environmental, social and cultural impacts of the Coastal Expressway are reflected in the complex, sophisticated and apparently expensive organisation and process suggested in the Transit Consenting Strategy for the Coastal Route. Transit presented the draft Consenting Strategy to the Panel on 15 February 2006. When considered in isolation from the submissions we have heard and considered, the Strategy is comprehensive, detailed and appears appropriate to a complex range of issues which will need to be addressed during the implementation of projects encompassed in the proposed WCP.
- 4.61 However the Consenting Strategy is likely to be expensive to develop and apply. Its outcomes are very uncertain. There may be difficulties in sourcing the appropriately qualified personnel to underpin the strategy given the length of time needed to implement it.
- 4.62 In our view the time has not arrived where Transit has enough evidence to justify a designation or resource consent which is consistent with any new WCP. There is not yet a Western Corridor Plan in the RLTS against which Transit could justify any particular designation or other application. The decision of GW as to what will be included in the RLTS is an important element of any assessment of the likely chance of success for whatever application it wished to make.
- 4.63 The submissions to the Panel indicate that there will be extensive and well resourced opposition to key components of the WCP at each stage of the designation and consenting process. The opposition would focus on:

- the 4 laning of the Centennial Highway
- the Pukerua Bay bypass
- the Mana bypass.

There will also be opposition to the institution of major works at the Paekakariki interchange.

- 4.64 On the evidence before us, the Sub-committee can only arrive at one conclusion. Obtaining the necessary designations and consents will be difficult, if not unlikely, for most of the key elements of the Coastal Route Upgrade given the requirements of the LTMA and the RMA. We rate the degree of difficulty as highest for the Mana bypass, followed by the Centennial Highway upgrade and Pukerua Bay Bypass. Failure to gain necessary designations or consents for one of those components of the WCP would likely diminish the effectiveness of other components. All these components appear necessary to obtain the benefits expected of the WCP.
- 4.65 The effect of the Environment Court decision in PCC, Middleton and others should not be underestimated. The public commitments by Transit to the development of TMG over many years could have a major influence on the outcome of RMA resource consent applications in that an alternative to the key elements of the proposed WCP has been identified and publicly endorsed by the consent applicant, Transit.
- 4.66 We received submissions, notably in 3259, to the effect that the decision of the Environmental Court in PCC, Middleton and others as Appellants and Transit as Respondent, W52/2001, could be fatal to any new application by Transit for a designation or resource consent for the Mana Bypass and especially to that Court.
- 4.67 The Sub-committee sought independent legal advice on the matter. We are of the view that should Transit at some later date seek to obtain a designation, the Court would likely consider any such proposal having regard to the circumstances and context then prevailing. The particular circumstances in which the assurances were given to the Court may have changed. In our view it is not correct to say that all assurances given to a Court bind the giver forever. Later known facts and circumstances may as a matter of public policy justify a different outcome. Nonetheless, the assurances given were treated by submitters as a sign of good faith and long term commitment to Transmission Gully as the preferred route for SH1. Transit would no doubt be called on to justify why the assurances given publicly and to the Court should not be binding on it, when seeking to undertake activities contrary to them.
- 4.68 While the Consenting Strategy proposes that all components of the Coastal Route Upgrade will be applied for at the one time, we were concerned that the Treasury review of cost estimates seems to contemplate a different approach, that is, a staged approach. The Sub-committee notes that in a staged approach, the proposed timing of the Mana Bypass may mean that applications for designations and consents would be the last in the sequence of applications to be filed. Given that this element of the proposed WCP is the one that will likely pose the greatest problems, and therefore the highest consenting risk, there is the potential that Transit may have to resile from the Coastal Route Upgrade at a very late stage, having already committed substantial financial resources in the expectation that the full Coastal Route Upgrade will gain the designations and consents required.
- 4.69 The Consenting Strategy goes so far as to suggest that a special division of the Environment Court may need to be set up and dedicated to dealing with the RMA consents associated with the route.

4.70 The Sub-committee notes that in preparing and releasing that Consenting Strategy the Transit Board is not expressing a preference for the Coastal Route. It states that:

"The Transit Board at its meeting on Wednesday 8 February 2006, endorsed the draft Consenting Strategy for advice to the Hearings Committee, noting specifically that the Board has yet to decide a preferred option for the State Highway 1 Wellington Western Corridor. If a Coastal option is adopted, the Board will be making a judgement on whether the draft Consenting Strategy has a reasonable prospect of success taking into account the issues raised during the consultation process".

The Sub-committee has taken careful note of the Transit Board's caveat on the release of the Consenting Strategy and anticipates it will be giving careful consideration to the matters raised in this Report.

4.71 It is the Sub-committee's view that the community antipathy against the Coastal Route, their expectations with regard to TGM and environmental, cultural and social impacts the Coastal Route is likely to have will make the Consenting Strategy difficult to implement despite the considerable effort that has been put into identifying appropriate project management and stakeholder liaison structures. Certainly, as we have noted previously, it is not simply a matter of implementing the Consenting Strategy in order to proceed with the Coastal Route. The WCP must be approved, integrated into the RLTS, a programme developed and agreed before consents can be sought for activities such as the proposed upgrade of the Coastal highway.

4.72 It is the view of the Sub-committee that it is undesirable for the Courts, Environment or others, to be taking decisions that should more appropriately be resolved by elected leaders. The social and economic costs of a decade or more of wrangling and the damage to relationships between communities and their key public agencies may not be quantifiable, but they will be high. We note with some concern the damage already done to public confidence in central, Regional and local government as regards to both decision-making and construction performance. We noted the stress on individuals and their families who have been suddenly confronted with the coastal upgrade proposals. There is now much to be done to engender a sense of trust and confidence in Transit and other agencies associated with the development of the proposed plan. That trust and confidence will depend on the public's view of the credibility of subsequent decisions, the perceived commitment of decision-makers and agencies to implement those decisions in a reasonable timeframe and within budget.

4.73 If, as we believe, the Coastal Route Upgrade as a whole, and in each of its constituent parts, will be extremely difficult to consent, what are the alternatives? Simply there are two. The first is to do nothing except proceed with measures to increase safety. The second is to proceed on Transit's previously stated intention to build TGM on already designated land. To take the former course would be to ignore the very clear problems with the current national roading system and national and Regional connectivity with the Capital City. Those problems are widely acknowledged. They are of national as well as Regional and local importance.

4.74 Most submitters want a decision on the corridor to be taken consistent within the spirit and intent of the LTMA. They want progress made with addressing the major issues affecting SH1 into and out of Wellington. They want decisions, certainty and action. Central Government has laid a challenge to the Region to resolve a pathway forward which will carry the commitment of the Region as a whole. In our view the opportunities are there and the costs of delay are rising. The Region should respond by suggesting a way forward to which, in return, the Government could respond by releasing the funding package to enable an amended WCP to proceed. The Sub-committee, through this Report, is attempting to assist the Government and the Region in that process.

- 4.75 The Sub-committee has found that there is substance to the concerns that were raised by some submitters about the cost differential of the Coastal Route Upgrade compared with TGM not being as great as those suggested in the proposed WCP consultation document. By way of example, the TGM estimate includes \$20 million value of land, approximately one third of which is already owned by Transit, at its current value (not historic cost). This sum excludes the additional \$14 million for contingencies and funding risks included in the overall project property cost item. We cannot find that similar treatment has been accorded to the sunk costs already incurred in bringing the Coastal Route to its current state. This example, together with the \$96 million error acknowledged by the Project Team, tends to reinforce submitters' arguments that the cost differential between the Coastal Route Upgrade and TGM is significantly smaller than represented in the consultation document.
- 4.76 The Sub-committee heard a number of submissions concerning the design standards being adopted for TGM suggesting that these were excessive and unjustified. We can accept that at this stage of project development, it is prudent to adopt a conservative approach to design solutions. That approach will be reflected in the cost estimates. We would expect that in further stages of project developments, particularly following the geotechnical assessment that there will be an opportunity to refine the design standards and cost estimates downwards as the buildability risks are better identified and resolved. We conclude that there will be a need for rigorous and transparent scrutiny of the solutions chosen and the design standards to ensure that the final project costs provide value-for-money.
- 4.77 The Sub-committee has found that it is possible to develop an affordable approach to TGM using the 95th percentile cost estimates by:
- deleting the \$18 million provided for tolling facilities
 - deferring the construction of the James Cook Drive interchange and link road until after 2026 or longer if it is not proved necessary.
- 4.78 A number of submitters have suggested the possibility of building a two (or three) lane TGM as a means of reducing the cost of the project. Others have suggested that only the northern section of TGM needs to be constructed. In considering these proposals the Sub-committee has accepted the logic of the arguments set out in TR12 by the Project Team on these proposals and therefore finds that none of these options would provide the benefits of a full four-lane TGM from Mackays Crossing to Linden. These benefits run both north-south and east-west. The risk associated with a half TGM is the unplanned for pressure on the Pauatahanui Inlet, SH58 and SH2 from Haywards Hill to Ngauranga. By constructing the southern section of TGM first, one could improve links between the Hutt Valley and Porirua without creating the pressure on the Pauatahanui Inlet that would be caused by the northern section of TGM being constructed first.

**Other Related
Roading
Projects**

- 4.79 If TGM is accepted as the strategically sound direction, there are some issues that will need to be addressed to address persistent safety and quality of life problems during the 8-10 years until the completion of TGM. Those problems relate to the following roads:

Paekakariki Interchange The intersection of access into Paekakariki, the Paekakariki Hill road and what is currently SH1 will be problematic until TGM is completed. It will still need management and control post TGM. Resident submitters are consistent in their views about how to deal with the interchange. Their recommendation is strict control of and reduced speed combined with traffic lights. This approach should be considered in the short term as it would be relevant to the opening of TGM.

In the short term, we acknowledge that Transit prefers not to place lights on state highways and we also acknowledge the undesirability of facilitating access out of Paekakariki Hill Road to the extent it encourages an even higher use of the road than current. However, we also observe the considerable safety risk that currently exists, the impacts and costs of more complicated interchange systems for what will be a limited period, and note that lights on state highways are by no means unprecedented in this region or on this corridor, and that the phasing of lights could be managed in such a way as to reduce the incentive to use Paekakariki Hill Road.

Pukerua Bay SH1 currently divides the Pukerua Bay community. There is both a bottleneck at Pukerua Bay which has emerged since the opening of the Mana Expressway and a need to reduce speeds through the village to reduce traffic related injury and enable local access. We have already observed that the Pukerua Bay community and submitters do not see the various proposals for a bypass as acceptable. We note that they believe any severance effects associated with the current road can be mitigated by the provision of additional underpass, or pedestrian overbridge facilities or lights. We would encourage those proposals to be discussed at an early stage with the Pukerua Bay community. Pukerua Bay submitters said that they would accept the current problems with the bottleneck, which has developed since the opening of the Mana expressway, if the works noted above were undertaken combined with a firm commitment made to proceed with TGM.

Airlie Road There is also a safety problem at the intersection of Airlie Rd (Whenua Tapu) and SH1, and some evidence of "rat-running" using the unsuitable Airlie Road connection to Plimmerton. A problem with major works to make the intersection safer is that they also make the unsuitable route more attractive. Residents submitting to the subcommittee indicated a similar approach to those in Paekakariki and Pukerua Bay – a preparedness to accept necessary minor safety works but a resistance to major works.

Whitford Brown Interchange The proposed \$30 million interchange was questioned by PCC and others during the hearings. There was a consensus that as the traffic involved is primarily local and the future status of this road is local, once TGM is operational, the existing traffic light solution is adequate.

SH58 Improvements to SH58 will be required, but the modelling of traffic volumes suggests that such improvements can for the foreseeable future be largely restricted to the current alignment, with some work to manage safety around those with direct access from properties and side roads to SH58.

Northern Expressway and Western Link Road

Submitter's Views 4.80 Only a few submitters focused on the proposals in the WCP relating to the Northern Expressway. The most substantial submissions came from the KCDC, which noted the Regional as well as the local importance of ensuring a functional SH1 north of Raumati. The immediate roading priorities were identified as resolving safety problems at Otaihanga intersection, providing a bypass for north-south traffic by way of the Western Link Road and a Waikanae underpass.

4.81 There are questions around proposals to modify the alignment of the Western Link at its southern connection with SH1. There is general agreement among submitters, however, that the Western Link Road will:

- provide an alternative crossing of the Waikanae River
- reduce congestion on SH1, by separating local and Regional traffic and directing local traffic to the Link Road
- improve safety around Waikanae and Paraparaumu
- increase integration of public transport by connecting to the proposed Lindale Bus/Rail Interchange.

4.82 Submitters were of the view that construction of the Western Link Road would enable the Northern Expressway construction to be postponed for many years.

4.83 Submitters believed that a combination of the Western Link Road and TGM would significantly improve the Regional transport network well into the future. Under those circumstances and to release available funding for TGM, KCDC indicated it would be willing to accept deferral of most elements of the Northern Expressway as proposed in the WCP with the exception of the Otaihanga Upgrades.

**Sub-
committee's
Response**

4.84 We accept the future merits of a Northern Expressway. We recognise that KCDC would prefer the Waikanae and Paraparaumu Upgrades to be undertaken within the next twenty years. We have taken from their submission that the combination of the Western Link Road with the TGM will provide the spine for future improvements of both the Regional and the local transport network within this part of the Region. From a Regional perspective those must be the priority in relation to roading expenditure together with ensuring intersection safety at Otaihanga. We have no evidence to suggest that there will be any significant issues of buildability or consentability involved. We note that KCDC has committed \$35m to the funding pool available to help fund costs associated with the Western Link Road. That commitment is to be commended.

Grays Road

**Submitter's
Views**

4.85 Grays Road attracted considerable attention from submitters. Early in the hearings process the Project Team and Wellington City Council who had requested that the Grays Road Upgrade be included in the proposed WCP advised the Sub-committee that the Upgrade as proposed was, on further reflection, not necessary. Many submitters would agree that substantial up-grading was neither possible nor desirable around the northern side of the Pauatahanui Inlet.

4.86 Submitters considered that significant widening of Grays Road would have considerable difficulties in gaining consent because of the environmental impacts on areas of native bush and on the Pauatahanui Inlet. There would also be considerable mitigation required for affected landowners, including making good water supplies, ensuring protection from salination, and compensating for loss of land necessary to the current range of farming activities.

4.87 Several submitters from Pauatahanui, including the local Residents' Association and the Pauatahanui Inlet Trust, were concerned with the potential impact of the Coastal Route Upgrade on further increasing traffic volumes on Grays Road. The Sub-committee heard evidence that use of Grays Road by east-west traffic had increased to around 5600 vehicles on average daily. The use of Grays Road by heavy traffic including truck/trailer units was identified by submitters as a safety, amenity and environmental problem which had increased with the construction of the Mana Upgrade. Submitters believed that the opening of the new Mana Upgrade had not reduced east-west traffic along Grays Road. Paekakariki Hill Road was seen as dangerous and Grays Road itself was seen as fragile, unable to cope with current traffic levels, subject to flooding and exposing the Pauatahanui Inlet to pollution from motor vehicles. Pauatahanui Resi-

dents' Association (submission 4777) represented the views of a number of submitters on that issue. A number of submitters also raised concerns about the safety of Grays Road for recreational users, such as cyclists and windsurfers.

4.88 Dealing with east-west traffic was seen as a critical issue if the environmental, amenity and safety issues of Grays Road are to be addressed. Porirua City Council modelling suggests that TGM would take significant pressure off Grays Road, reducing the projected traffic in 2021 by half. Most submitters agreed that TGM would have beneficial impacts as long as effective mitigation measures were put in place to protect the Pauatahanui Inlet. Other submitters tended to agree with that position, but were concerned that problems would increase if only a Northern TGM section was constructed.

**Sub-
committee's
Response**

4.89 The Sub-committee accepts that Grays Road is a fragile road through an area of significant environmental and amenity values. There are safety issues on a narrow road which is exposed to flooding with uncertain camber being used as an arterial road by both cars and by heavy transport. The reduction of through traffic along Grays Road could be achieved through the improved east-west connection provided to through traffic by TGM, but even if TGM is pursued, it will be up to a decade before the positive impacts on Grays Road would be felt. In the transitional period, the Sub-committee finds that some investigation of traffic calming options to reduce the likelihood of use of Grays Road by heavy traffic while preserving access to current landowners and recreational users is required. We encourage PCC to work appropriate options through with the local community, and groups representing the interests of recreational users.

Petone – Grenada Link Road

**Submitter's
Views**

4.90 Compared to the Coastal Route Upgrade/TGM issues, the other roading proposals in the proposed WCP generated relatively low levels of public comment. Of the remaining proposals, the most anxiety was expressed around the Petone-Grenada Link Road. Four aspects of that proposal generated comment:

- First, with a few exceptions, the link was not seen as an effective means by which the problems of West-East linkage or Ngauranga Gorge congestion could be resolved.
- Secondly, the buildability and usability of the road given the steep gradients was questioned.
- Thirdly, the traffic congestion impacts on SH2 and the Petone Esplanade were highlighted.
- Finally, there was considerable concern expressed around the social and environmental impacts of the options presented for public discussion.

Table 5: Submission Analysis: Petone – Grenada Link Road

Total Submissions on Petone – Grenada Link Road	354	% of submissions
Opposed	316	89.3
Supportive	26	7.3
Not stated	12	3.4

- 4.91 There was strong opposition expressed by local residents in both the Horokiwi and the Korokoro communities on health, social and environmental grounds, refer submissions 3426, 3736, 4758, 5384 and 5603. Only a few submitters saw the proposal as relieving congestion at the bottom of Ngauranga Gorge. Indeed, the Hutt City Council (HCC) and Petone Community Board suggested that the current proposals, which appeared to deliver traffic onto the western end of the Petone Esplanade and the junction with SH2, would generate considerable problems in an area which already showed considerable capacity problems. The strong proponent for the Petone-Grenada Link Road was WCC. They have advised us that they do not see the appropriate alignment as been those presented in the consultation process (He and He 6 Variants). Many other submitters noted the importance of relieving congestion at the bottom of Ngauranga Gorge, but they expressed an open mind as to how best this congestion relief might be achieved. A useful analysis of the problem appearing from submitter 5607. Alternatives raised by submitters included: an upgrade of the existing road between Ngauranga and Petone and the Aotea Quay off-ramp; introduction of HOV lanes in Ngauranga Gorge; the widening of the road at the bottom of the Gorge, as it links with SH 2 heading North; and the construction of an extra lane between Petone and Ngauranga.
- 4.92 Submitters were particularly concerned about the lack of specificity on the proposal on which they were being asked to comment and expressed bemusement about the incorporation of this proposal in the proposed WCP. Initial consultation on the east-west link had previously been undertaken in the context of the Hutt Corridor Plan.
- 4.93 Serious process issues were raised by submitters about the proposed Petone-Grenada Link Road by many submitters, especially 4758 and 5603. They noted that the idea for a Petone-Grenada Link Road had formed part of the Hutt Corridor study but they understood that those proposals had been shelved. No productive consultation with community groups had occurred during either the first or second phases of the consultation on the Western Corridor. It was noted that there was no reference to the possibility of a Petone-Grenada Link Road forming part of the WCP in the documentation that was put out to consultation on Phase One of the Western Corridor Study. Many of the submitters, whose houses and businesses appear most likely to be affected, expressed concern that they only became aware of the revival of the Petone-Grenada Link Road through, or subsequent to, a mid-July announcement by the Ministers of Finance and Transport, and the Chair of GW that funding had been approved and that a Petone-Grenada Link Road was likely to be built.
- 4.94 Many submitters, especially the Korokoro Environmental Group, raised serious concerns about the environmental and community impacts of the two possible routings presented in the Stage 3 consultation – HE 6 (which runs through Horokiwi) and HE 6 Variant (which runs up the Korokoro Stream Valley). In particular, the loss of the ecological and amenity value of the Korokoro Stream, the destruction of the rural community of Horokiwi, safety risks associated with changing and increased traffic use and problems of merging at SH2, and significant noise impacts on the residents of

Korokoro. Submitters believed the PBS analysis of those impacts, particularly the noise impacts, were significantly under-estimated or under-valued.

4.95 Concerns were also raised about geotechnical risks, buildability, and likelihood of cost overruns on these two routes. It was also noted that no funding for the Petone terminus of any link road has been identified. Submission 2077 presented data indicating that both routes would have gradients in excess of Ngauranga Gorge. A number of submitters also suggested that both routes would have gradients well in excess of those in Ngauranga Gorge. Submitters were concerned that this would mean either the road would not be effective in relieving heavy vehicle congestion at Ngauranga and/or that heavy vehicles would be in low gear both in up- and downward trips on the road which would generate considerable noise and emission impacts.

4.96 A number of submitters have suggested that the money currently allocated in the plan to the Petone-Grenada Link Road should be redeployed to the construction of TGM.

**Sub-
committee's
Response**

4.97 The Sub-committee observes that the inclusion of a mis-named Petone-Grenada Link Road in the proposed WCP, the presentation of options to the public in the form of HE6 and HE6 Variants and inadequacies in relation to consultation have all contributed to this proposal becoming contentious. Because of the lack of clarity around the proposal, its rationale and status, and because of the considerable anxiety about the HE6 and HE6 Variants put out for consultation, the Sub-committee has spent considerable time attempting to establish the fundamental problems that the proposal is directed to addressing.

4.98 In summary, the proposal appears to be generated out of two critical problems: first, the congestion at Ngauranga Gorge generated by traffic turning left onto SH2 and heading to Petone and the Hutt Valley, and, secondly, the need to better integrate the Western Corridor with the Hutt Corridor and particularly through to Gracefield. Both those problems are real and the Sub-committee finds that both need to be addressed.

4.99 The Sub-committee observes that submitters found that the Petone-Grenada Link Road proposal put out to consultation had a number of problems which created significant anxiety among affected communities. Those are:

- The funding for any interchange at Petone is stated as excluded from the funding allocation indicated in the consultation document for the proposed WCP. We have subsequently been advised by the Project Team that this statement in the consultation document was in error.
- The publicised options had already been considered in the Hutt Corridor Plan and considered undesirable because of the impacts on local communities and the Korokoro Stream. In our view the impacts of the options presented do have significant community and environmental impacts many of which the PBS appears to under-estimate, particularly in relation to safety, amenity values, environment, and noise impacts.
- Risks that the project will be seen as predetermined. Serious process issues were raised about the proposed Petone - Grenada Link Road by many submitters. The possibility of a link was made in the Phase 2 documentation released for comment in May 2005, but no attempt was made by the project team to consult those that might be directly affected by the proposal. The results of the Phase 2 consultation were not reported back until 8 July.

4.100 After examining the change and timing of advice and decision-making around funding for Petone – Grenada Link Road in response to the procedural concerns raised by submitters, the Sub-committee observes that it could be seen as irregular in terms of the requirements of the LTMA.

- 4.101 In particular, the Sub-committee notes that on 4 July 2005 (4 days before the results of the Western Corridor Phase 2 consultation were released) the Cabinet Business Committee considered a paper seeking funding that might allow prioritising roading investment to the Kapiti Western Link Road and Petone-Grenada Link Road.
- 4.102 The members of the Sub-committee have visited the area and studied the proposed routings HE 6 and HE 6 Variant. We have concluded that there is considerable substance to the concerns raised by submitters. There would indeed appear to be a range of risks associated with these two possible routings – risks around consentability, buildability, geotechnical, and cost – which have led us to conclude that if a link road is to be pursued that both HE 6 and HE 6 Variant should be abandoned as possibilities.
- 4.103 The Sub-committee appreciates that many of those problems have been subsequently recognised by Transit and GW. We have been advised that Transit, WCC and the HCC are actively exploring the development of options which better address the critical problems of west-east connectedness and are also exploring different alignments. We believe that a Southern West-East link should be a priority. The development of a proposal that takes traffic West-East traffic out of Ngauranga and links into the Dowse Interchange and the Cross Valley Connector is desirable. Such proposal needs more work and further, formal and comprehensive public consultation.
- 4.104 During the hearings a number of submitters noted that a road through the Horokiwi Quarry might be more feasible than either HE 6 or HE 6 Variant. The Sub-committee suggests that this be explored further, but note that the link point between such a road and SH 2 might not be ideal. Issues of design and consentability aside, we do wonder whether the most logical road alignment should be between the new Dowse interchange and Grenada (or indeed the interchange proposed between the southern terminus of the TGM and SH1). This would allow traffic, particularly commercial traffic to travel from Gracefield and Seaview along the Cross Valley Connector road through the Dowse interchange straight to SH1 or TGM thus relieving congestion on both SH 2, Ngauranga and along the Petone Esplanade. Study of those options would be desirable.
- 4.105 The Sub-committee notes that there are other means by which congestion at the bottom of Ngauranga Gorge can be managed. Given that this is an issue that relates principally to congestion in the Ngauranga Gorge, and as a study is to be undertaken on the Ngauranga to Wellington Airport Corridor, we propose that the solution to this congestion problem be picked up as part of this new study. That study is of regional import. It will also allow for the procedures set down in the LTMA to be followed correctly with regard to this problem.
- 4.106 Overall the Sub-committee finds that:
- The consulted options fail to integrate appropriately at the Hutt Corridor in a way that will optimise the Petone, Dowse and Gracefield connection, and avoid the risk of imposing significant additional traffic burdens on the already congested Petone Esplanade.
 - The grades associated with the options consulted on are extreme and raise questions about whether the road will be used as intended and also suggest that use will generate considerable vehicle noise affecting the health of nearby residents.
 - There was inadequate consultation with the public. These proposals had been part of stage 1 and stage 2 consultation under the proposed Hutt Corridor Plan. In our view, it could not be assumed that interested parties or residents affected would have realised the shift of this proposal from one corridor plan to another. Under those circumstances, it would have been desirable for the relevant residents associations and those who had submitted on the proposals in the context of the Hutt Corridor to be directly advised of the inclusion of a Petone-Grenada Link Road in the WCP.

- The manner in which the Petone-Grenada Link Road has been introduced to the proposed WCP at a relatively late stage raises a number of potential procedural issues in terms of compliance with the LTA.
- 4.107 A number of submitters have suggested that the money currently allocated in the plan to the Petone-Grenada Link Road should be redeployed to the construction of TGM/SH58. As explained elsewhere in this Report we disagree. Submitters and the Project Team tell us that the congestion problem at the bottom of Ngauranga Gorge a serious and urgent problem for the Region. It requires action not indefinite deferral.
- 4.108 Although many submitters expressed the view that a Petone-Grenada Link Road would be redundant if a TGM-SH58 connection was constructed, the Sub-committee found that there is a need for an east-west connection in the southern section of the Western Corridor that merits investigation. The Sub-committee requested and received further advice on this point. A February 2006 Booz Allen Hamilton report, "Impacts of Petone-Grenada Link" observes that "30% of PG morning peak users would come from Porirua south of Mana, 25% from Tawa, and around 35% from Johnsonville/Newlands." This adds to material supplied earlier by the project team showing regional freight desire lines concentrated in the triangle Tawa-Gracefield-Port. For the considerable population and freight movement circulating in the southern area of the Western Corridor, SH58 is not a relevant option for east-west travel. However such a need does not justify the particular Petone-Grenada Link Road proposed. The LTA requires that a Petone-Grenada Link Road proposal be assessed against the range of criteria of S. 175(2) through a public consultation process.
- 4.109 The Sub-committee suggests that the funding currently allocated to a Petone-Grenada Link Road (\$180 million) be dedicated to the necessary investigation, consultation and construction of a solution for a Southern West-East Link from Grenada to Gracefield. That process needs to be collaborative between Transit, the HCC and WCC. It also needs to engage actively with local communities.
- 4.110 The Sub-committee notes that the connection from the Hutt Corridor to the Western Corridor needs to be sequenced to ensure that it builds onto an operational Cross Valley Connector to avoid negative traffic impacts on other roads. It is critical that the design options ensure that there are appropriate connections to SH1 including, assuming the decision to take forward TGM as suggested in this report, how to achieve integration with the southern interchange of TGM. Given that there are significant options to be developed and consultation is required, the project may need to be repositioned if it is unable to be completed within the eight year timeframe indicated in the proposed WCP consultation document.
- 4.111 The proposed study should include investigation of HOV lanes in Ngauranga Gorge, but we have been advised that the problem of lane merging and weaving in Ngauranga Gorge makes implementation of HOV lanes impracticable. The Sub-committee finds that the HOV project should be deferred and the \$5 million allocated to this in the proposed WCP be reallocated to increased rail capacity.

Rail and Public Passenger Transport

- Submitter's Views** 4.112 Around 10% of written submissions referred to public passenger transport. Among those there was almost universal support for upgrading rail.
- 4.113 Although many submitters suggested that rail would not displace reliance on the flexibility offered by private motor vehicles, there was widespread support for what might be described as a rejuvenation of rail through track, rolling stock, facilities, ticketing and timetabling improvements. One submitter presented a forceful case for

the reallocation of public transport subsidies from rail to a system of 'super buses'. Nevertheless, most submitters commenting on public transport saw, upgraded rail as a clear and desirable option for commuter, employment-related travel.

- 4.114 Those with expertise in the operation of rail services in the Region that the rail corridor itself presented significant and potentially costly challenges including: the fragility of the line from Pukerua Bay to Paekakariki and the barrier to increased frequency and improved travel times of the Kaiwharawhara 'throat'.
- 4.115 The Sub-committee received detailed proposals for further rail improvements from GW, TranzMetro, Transport 2000+ and the Green Party, Waikanae Community Board made a strong case for extending electrification to Waikanae, and Otaki residents for extension to Otaki. Tawa Community Board observed operational problems with level crossings needing attention now. KCDC observed the degree to which inadequate parking provision was already undermining rail performance. Submitter 2527 gave a graphic account of how current speed restrictions, curve and gradient conditions on the fragile Pukerua-Paekakariki section (and other sections) severely limited rail performance, but also how there was room for better performance through some modest improvements.
- 4.116 We note that the people of the Region already have a commuting culture that is rail aware and sees rail travel as desirable. The potential in the Region for generating a modal shift from private vehicle use to rail appears to be significant. In this corridor, rail already accounts for 25% of morning peak travel, a figure that is very high by international standards. All the more surprising then is the fact that rail transit times on this corridor are on average slower than car transit time, except within peak hours. The corridor is well suited to rail's strengths – separate track, long-distance passengers, point-to-point rail travel.
- 4.117 Rail upgrade, however, cannot avoid the need to construct a reliable and effective road network to address a backlog of delayed infrastructure investment on national and regional roading within the Wellington region as well as additional demand associated with the desire to increase economic activity and productivity. As noted, rail can and should cater for the peak commute very well, and it has potential elsewhere too, but it is not a suitable solution for the entire range of travel demands – interpeak and at weekends, east-west as well as north –south, for local freight and commercial movement, for journeys to shop, recreate or visit. In the sub-committee's view, the rail-only solution advocated by a small number of submitters could not meet the test of providing a sufficient answer to access and mobility needs.
- 4.118 Submitters generally agree that the upgrading of rail for both passenger services and for freight is desirable. Notably, the main priorities for submitters in relation to rail was not increased frequency, but increased reliability, capacity and quality of the rail experience. In particular, the up-grading and increased capacity of rolling stock, parking and station facilities were upper most in the submissions about commuter rail.
- 4.119 Electrification and double tracking would require a significant investment. The Sub-committee considers that significant investment is required in the rail infrastructure to allow rail to make the contribution it could make to both efficient movement of commuters throughout the Region and cost-effective movement of freight. We have no doubt that an efficient, integrated rail system would be of national as well as Regional benefit, including modal shift for passengers and goods, and such a system requires both a double-track capacity and electrification.
- 4.120 The Sub-committee was advised that the current trackbed, especially from Pukerua Bay to Paekakariki is on a vulnerable to weather events and earthquake because of the geological conditions and the potential for slumping of existing fill on which the track

is laid. Many of the problems we have identified in relation to proposals to upgrade the Centennial Highway can be equally applied to significant up-grading of the track capacity for rail in that area. Moreover, we have been told that a critical limiting factor to rail frequency in the present corridor is the current arrangement of what is termed the Kaiwharawhara 'throat' which, strictly, lies outside the ambit of the proposed WCP. In addition, we note that increased frequency could generate a number of entry and egress problems for some of the small communities for whom access is across level-crossings over the main trunk line.

4.121 Under those conditions, the Sub-committee finds that substantial further investigation of different options for investment in the rail track to improve connectivity and capacity is needed. Those investigations need to explore:

- means by which rail transit times can be reduced to match car transit times
- the options for and benefits of realigning part of the current track
- means by which there could be better east-west integration of the rail network
- track upgrade plans able to optimise rail access to communities while facilitating efficient freight transport, particularly to the port
- expanded park and ride facilities as basis for promoting extended rail use by commuters and addressing current capacity barriers in station car parks
- means by which access to local communities currently using level crossings could be enhanced.

4.122 The Sub-committee concludes that in the meantime, limited double tracking is warranted from MacKay's Crossing to Raumati. The Sub-committee notes that some designs for roading proposals in the proposed Coastal Expressway involve rail realignment. Given the need for significant investment in the rail infrastructure, the Sub-committee do not consider it prudent to undertake ad hoc realignment in that way. It would be preferable for realignment to be undertaken within the context of a comprehensive Regional rail strategy. The Sub-committee observes that that strategy could include, as the WCP proposes, a long term commitment to double-tracking Pukerua Bay to Paekakariki via a tunnel in the period 2026-2035.

4.123 The Sub-committee is of the view that rail upgrade cannot be a substitute for the construction of a reliable and effective road network to address a backlog delayed infrastructure investment on national and Regional roading within the Wellington Region as well as additional demand associated with the desire to increase economic activity and productivity. Nevertheless, the Sub-committee has found that significant improvements in passenger rail services can be made by:

- Increasing the quality and quantity of passenger rolling stock for commuters.
- Increasing parking facilities at and access to stations including the addition of Lindale and Raumati stations.
- Improving the amenities at stations including properly formed car parks and foot paths, provision of security, adequate lighting and platform shelter.
- Providing better integration with other transport modes by:
 - better coordinating bus and train services
 - improving facilities for cycles on trains and at stations
 - providing appropriate carriage ramping for people with disabilities
 - integrating ticketing with other lines and with public buses.

4.124 These findings are consistent with the direction set out in the proposed WCP. Indeed some are specifically timetabled within that proposed plan. It is our view, however, that

a clear commitment to rail as an effective transport mode is required. The Region needs to turn its mind to its broader strategic needs of the Region for a sustainable, efficient and future oriented rail network for people and goods and to how responding to those needs can be financed.

4.125 The Sub-committee has found that the case for the Porirua Bus/Rail Interchange being a priority was not made in the proposed WCP consultation document or the submissions. We have therefore proposed deferring expenditure on this activity into the second 10 year period, and have suggested that funding, if and when required, be provided by PCC. We have also found that the Waikanae electrification, while important into the longer term, should be deferred until the third 10-year period on funding grounds but should be considered a priority for acceleration should any residual funding arise. The Sub-committee has reallocated the \$5 million that was proposed for Ngauranga HOV lanes to the purchase of additional rail units.

Travel Demand Management (TDM)

Submitter's Views

4.126 There were relatively few written submissions on the TDM proposals. During the hearings process, however, there was a consistent theme around the need to change patterns of commuting behaviour in the context of rising oil prices and climate change. Where submitters commented on those issues, there was seen to be a pressing need for more efficient use of existing road capacity, better planned use of vehicles, and a need to reduce the environmental and health impacts of private vehicle use. TDM was seen as a way of achieving those outcomes.

4.127 There was a sense of disappointment expressed with the lack of specificity around TDM measures and approaches. Submitters were particularly concerned to encourage local initiatives designed to reduce traffic congestion. TDM activities identified by submitters included using 'walking school buses', increased car pooling, and the provision of radio and internet-based information about traffic conditions to allow better journey planning and travel management. Submitters did point out that effective TDM does depend on an integrated transport system that is both resilient and allows significant modal choice.

4.128 There was an element of general support for the concepts of TDM to encourage higher modal shift to public passenger transport. Tolling, as a form of road pricing, could be used as a TDM technique, however this would require legislative changes to permit network or cordon tolling schemes.

Sub-committee's Response

4.129 The Sub-committee notes the general support expressed by submitters for TDM. Given, however, that there was little specificity in the proposed WCP, the Sub-committee can make no further observation or findings beyond presenting submitters' views for consideration by GW in developing a more specified response to TDM. Although the Project Team identified relatively low benefits as a result of the TDM measures, the Sub-committee considers that these are nevertheless desirable in the interests of achieving a sustainable land transport system.

5 Moving Forward: Funding our Findings

Introduction

- 5.1 The Sub-committee has found that the proposed WCP requires amendment to better accord with the statutory requirements for the preparation of regional land transport strategies, and in particular, to have regard to the views of affected communities and avoid adverse environmental effects. Those amendments have been overviewed in summary in Section 1 and more detailed rationale for those findings can be found in Section 4 of this report. The tables below lists those amendments of the proposed WCP that the Sub-committee believes have merit, against that background.
- 5.2 In coming to these findings the Sub-committee is satisfied the amended WCP we have identified can be funded within the package of likely available funding already suggested for the proposed WCP. The funding available in the first 10 year period is nominally \$1,006.25 million, with \$548.15 million in the second 10 year period if the \$10 million from PCC is included.
- 5.3 Table 6 below shows the fundability of the Sub-committee's amended WCP and compares it directly to the existing proposed WCP drawn from the Treasury review of cost estimates.

Table 6: The Amended WCP compared to the proposed WCP

WCP Non-road Construction Projects								
Area	Current Projects in proposed WCP				Sub-committee findings on projects and amendments to the proposed WCP			
	Project	Cost estimate	Timing	Funding sources	Sub-committee finding	Cost estimate	Timing	Funding sources
North	MacKays to Raumati double tracking	\$40m	1 st decade	C2 & L	Alter to MacKay's to Lindale DT	\$62m	1 st decade	R & L
	Raumati Station	\$5m	1 st decade	L & C1	Agree	\$5m	1 st decade	L & C1
	Lindale Bus Rail Interchange	\$10m	1 st decade	C2 & L	Agree	\$10m	1 st decade	C2 & L
Central	Porirua Bus/Rail Interchange	\$10m	1 st decade	R & L	Defer to 2 nd decade and funds to come from PCC	\$10m	2 nd decade	L
Regionwide promotion, car sharing, travel planning	TDM marketing and promotion, car sharing, travel planning	\$2.5m	1 st decade	C1	Agree	\$2.5m	1 st decade	C1
	TDM marketing and promotion, car sharing, travel planning	\$2.5m	2 nd decade	R	Accelerate. Note that R funding cannot be the source of funding in 2 nd decade	\$2.5m	1 st decade	R
	TDM extension of ATMS along corridor	\$5m	1 st decade	C2	Agree	\$5m	1 st decade	C2
	Ngauranga Gorge HOV lanes	\$5m	1 st decade	C2	Defer	-	-	-
	Additional Rail Units	\$35m	1 st decade	C2 & L	Increase	\$40m	1 st decade	C2 & L
	Total 1st decade Cost	\$112.5m			Total 1st decade cost	\$127m		
	Total 2nd decade Cost	\$2.5m			Total 2nd decade cost	\$12.5m		

WCP Road Construction Projects								
Area	Current Projects in proposed WCP				Sub-committee findings on projects and amendments to the proposed WCP			
	Project	Cost estimate	Timing	Funding sources	Sub committee finding	Cost estimate	Timing	Funding source
North	Western Link Road Stage 1	\$65m	1 st decade	N, R, C2, L	Agree	\$65m	1 st decade	L & N
	Western Link Road Stage 2	\$35m	1 st decade		Agree	\$35m	1 st decade	L & C2
	Western Link Road Stage 3	\$40m	1 st decade		Agree	\$40m	1 st decade	R, L & C2
	Paraparaumu Bypass	\$140m	2 nd decade	N	Delete	-	-	-
	Waikanae Upgrade	\$80m	2 nd decade	N	Decrease by \$20m to total of \$60m. Accelerated start in 1 st decade	\$3.25m \$56.75m	1 st decade start 2 nd decade completion	L for 1 st decade start
	Otaihanga Interchange Stage 1	\$35m	2 nd decade	C2	Alter to 1 st decade	\$35m	1 st decade	N & C2
	Otaihanga Interchange Stage 2	\$20m	2 nd decade	N	Delete	-	-	-
	Northern Expressway remainder	\$125m	2 nd decade	N	Delete	-	-	-
Central	Paekakariki Interchange Stage 1	\$25m	1 st decade	C2	Alter to traffic lights	\$1m	1 st decade	N
	Paekakariki Interchange Stage 2	\$20m	2 nd decade	C3	Delete	-	-	-
	Coastal Expressway (Centennial Highway)	\$365m	2 nd decade	C3	Delete. Replace with TGM.	\$513m \$437.4m \$20.75m	1 st decade 2 nd decade 3 rd decade	C2, C3 & N
	TGM geotechnical work	\$5m	1 st decade	To be determined	Agree	\$5m	1 st decade	C3
				Add TGM to SH2 link	\$44m	2 nd decade		
	Pukerua Bay Bypass (2 lane)	\$50m	1 st decade	C2	Delete. Replace with safety improvements	\$2m	1 st decade	N
	Pukerua Bay Bypass (4 lane)	\$20m	2 nd decade	C3	Delete.	-	-	-
	Mana Bypass	\$220m	2 nd decade	N	Delete	-	-	-
	Gray's Road Upgrade	\$60m	2 nd decade	To be determined	Delete	-	-	-
	Whitford Brown Interchange	\$30m	1 st decade	R	Delete	-	-	-
Southern	Petone - Grenada Link Road	\$180m	1 st decade	C1, C2 & L	Replace with Grenada - Gracefield	\$180m	1 st decade	C1, C2 & L
	Tawa Interchange	\$15m	2 nd decade	N	Defer. Investigate opportunity to incorporate in Grenada - Gracefield (See above)	-	-	-
Total 1st decade Cost		\$430m			Total 1st decade Cost	\$879.25m		
Total 2nd decade Cost		\$1,100m			Total 2nd decade Cost	\$538.15m		

- 5.4 As noted in Section 1, and shown in the table above, the particular amendments to the WCP suggested by the Sub-committee are:
- Deletion of the proposed roading improvements of the central section of the proposed WCP including:
 - the upgrade of Centennial Highway
 - the Pukerua Bay Bypass
 - the Mana Bypass.
 - Inclusion of the TGM from Mackays Crossing in the North to Linden in the South as currently designated.
 - Deleting the proposed toll facilities of any TGM and the James Cook Interchange in the current TGM design.
 - Deferral of the complete Northern Expressway, and completion of minor safety works on this stretch of SH1 in the meantime.
 - Deletion of the Grays Road Upgrade and Whitford Brown Interchange.
 - Replacement of the current suggested alignment of the Petone-Grenada Link Road with a new alignment following further investigation and consultation with affected communities.
 - Deferral of Ngauranga HOV lanes.
 - Increase allocation for purchase of extra rail units by \$5 million.

5.5 The proposed WCP and evidence presented by the Project Team to the Sub-committee suggested the existence of a funding gap between the TGM and the Coastal Route Upgrade in the second 10-year funding period. The reason cited for this is that TGM would not qualify for NLTF funding but that a Mana Bypass would, creating a \$220 million gap. It was also suggested that another component of the plan - the Northern Expressway - would qualify for NLTF funding. \$400 million was earmarked in the WCP for the Northern Expressway. We have previously stated that the Sub-committee does not agree with those assumptions.

5.6 The Sub-committee concludes that while future NLTF funding allocations are always uncertain, there is reason to believe that as strong a case can be made for TGM as for the Mana Bypass or the Northern Expressway, particularly given the clear problems in the network, the relative ease of consents and the importance of an alternative route to ensure resilience. The Sub-committee has taken the advice of Land Transport NZ that:

“Land Transport New Zealand has no general policy that prevents funding of activities with Benefit/Cost Ratios of less than 1.

However, the Allocation Process requires that all improvement projects be assessed against three factors:

- 1. the seriousness and urgency of the transport issue or problem addressed*
- 2. the effectiveness of the proposed solution in dealing with the issue*
- 3. the economic efficiency of the proposal.*

Economic efficiency is represented by the benefit/cost ratio (BCR) of the project (or package of projects).

Each activity is assessed against these factors and given a “profile”. Each year Land Transport determines the threshold profile for funding, depending on the funds likely to be available for the NLTP. Your examples with BCR significantly less than one would have to have very high ratings for seriousness and urgency and effectiveness to be considered for inclusion in the NLTP or later for funding approval. I understand, though, that the benefits

generated by the modelling process may be less than those generated by a full analysis. I am not aware just how much understated they are.

A very low BCR is indirectly related to a low "first year rate of return". A low first year rate of return is an indicator that the project (which may be the best long-term solution to the transport issue or problem) is being considered for funding significantly before its time.

With regard to Crown funding, Land Transport's Programme and Funding Manual states "Land Transport NZ may use different thresholds for activities funded using regionally distributed, or Crown funds than those funded using nationally distributed funds." In practice, this usually means acceptance of a lower threshold for BCR. However a decision to fund at significantly below 1 could only be taken by the Land Transport Board, and only after consideration of the profile of the activity and its contribution to the objectives of the NZTS."

Funding the Amended WCP

- 5.7 We set out below a detailed spreadsheet which identifies the funding plan for our suggested amended WCP. The cost of the suggested amended WCP is identical to the draft WCP that was consulted upon, for the next two decades, except for the addition of \$10m from PCC, as discussed above in Section 4. The Sub-committee has, however, come to the view that longer term strategic visioning is required and has therefore found that some activities need to be identified for periods beyond 20 years. In particular we suggest the electrification to Waikanae needs to be a priority for decade three.
- 5.8 In coming to our findings in relation to TGM, the Sub-committee has accepted that funding is certain for the first decade. We have not identified the source of the funding for the completion of the Transmission Gully Motorway in the second ten year funding period. This will be a political decision to be made at the time.
- 5.9 The Sub-committee notes that there is uncertainty around the cost estimates for TGM. During the course of the hearings, the Project Team have already advised us that the cost of the TGM option was overstated in the consultation document. The Project Team advised us that the figure was overstated by \$106 million, although the Treasury review lists the figure as \$96 million overstated. For the purposes of our analysis we have used the \$96 million figure. The Sub-committee has used the cost estimate at the 95th percentile for TGM as being \$984 million. We note however, if the Project Team's view of the extent of overstated costs is correct, then the 95th percentile cost estimate for TGM should be \$974 million.
- 5.10 The total cost of TGM's initial construction assumed in the above table (\$955.4 million) has been adjusted to reflect the Sub-committee's findings regarding the deletion of tolling facilities and the deferral of the James Cook Drive interchange and associated link road until after 2025.
- 5.11 The use of the 95th percentile estimate for TGM is very much a worst case scenario. As the Treasury review of cost estimates notes (p11) *"the 95th percentile estimate includes an additional contingency over and above the expected estimate such that there is a 95% chance that the actual cost will be less than the 95th percentile estimate"*. Once geotechnical and design work has been completed, a more accurate costing will be available, with the chance that the cost for TGM will be lower than that used in our analysis. If the estimated costs of TGM are reduced we suggest that the savings be allocated in the first instance to accelerate the electrification of rail from Lindale to Waikanae.
- 5.12 The Sub-committee has found that the extent of the safety upgrades that the Project Team suggest are required on the Coastal Route if TGM proceeds are not necessary.

These findings are set out in Section 4 . However, some work will need to be undertaken, and has been budgeted for in funding amendments suggested by the Sub-committee.

- 5.13 Our proposals do not attempt to remedy current deficiencies on local roads. Grays Road, Airlie Road and Paekakariki Hill Road all attracted submitter's comments. Grays Road attracted the largest number. PCC may wish to review its level of investment in these roads as a priority if our amended WCP is adopted and incorporated into the RLTS.
- 5.14 On the final day of hearings the Sub-committee was briefed by GW on its draft Regional Passenger Transport Strategy. During this presentation GW noted that there had not been formal GW Council commitment to the \$30 million identified in the proposed WCP and allocated to a range of rail initiatives. For the purposes of our analysis we have assumed that GW will in due course make this formal commitment. If this funding is not allocated the result would be deferral of all the rail projects identified for completion within the first 10 year period because this funding is integral to the completion of each of them.

Table 7: Funding Plan for Amended WCP

	Estimated cost 2006–2025	2006-15 Central Government Funding	2006-15 Local Government Funding	R ⁵	C1	C2	C3	N	2016 –2025	2026 –2035
Waikanae Electrification										40
Waikanae upgrade	60		3.25						56.75	
Otaihanga Interchange	35	35				12		23		
Western Link Stage 1	65	48.75	16.25					48.75		
Western Link Stage 2	35	26.25	8.75			26.25				
Western Link Stage 3	40	30	10	12.75		17.75				
Lindale Bus Rail	10	6	4		6					
Raumati Station	5	3	2		3					
Mackays to Lindale DT	62	55.25	6.75	55.25						
Transmission Gully	955.4	518			49	64	405		437.4	20.75
Paekakariki Safety	1	1						1		
Pukerua Bay Safety	2	2						2		
TGM to SH2 link	44								44	
Porirua Bus/rail interchange	10								10 ⁶	
Grenada - Gracefield	180	135	45			135				
TDM	10	10			10					
Extra Rail Units	40	26	14		26					
Pukerua Bay- Paekakariki Rail										272 ⁷
Totals Cost	1554.4	896.25	110	68	94	255	405	74.75	548.15	332.75
Available Funding Excluding Tolls	1554.9	896.75	110						548.15	

⁵ The funding sources (R, C1, C2, C3 and N) are explained in section 2.16

⁶ Note - This \$10m to be funded by PCC

⁷ 95th percentile cost, Pukerua Bay to Paekakariki Rail Tunnel Feasibility Report, Beca, March 2005

Annex 1: Key Components of the Proposed WCP

VISION AND LONG TERM STRATEGY

The vision for the Western Corridor is an affordable, safe, efficient, reliable and sustainable transportation corridor for the benefit of the Region and the nation that provides reasonable capacity. The long term strategy for the plan includes provisions relating to land use, passenger transport, freight and roads, as shown below.

Land Use	Support land use that minimises road use Support intensification of land use around Passenger Transport nodes
Passenger Transport	Maintain rail as the key Passenger Transport commuting service
Transport	Increase rail capacity in line with demand Enhance accessibility to rail services Extend rail services to the north in line with demand Improve efficiency of the existing service Improve reliability of the existing service Complement rail services with local bus networks Provide priority to buses in congested areas Integrate rail and bus services
Freight	Improve linkage between Seaview and the north Provide priority to road freight in congested areas Provide improved rail freight capacity in line with demand
Roads	Apply Travel Demand Management measures to maintain and increase Passenger Transport modal share Develop alternative routes for use in emergencies Partially relieve congestion south of Tawa with infrastructure Manage remaining travel demand south of Tawa Improve links to the Hutt Valley Develop a multi-lane median-divided expressway along the full length of the corridor matching sustainable levels of demand Upgrade Grays Road

NORTHERN SECTION

Key proposals in the northern section of the plan are:

- **A new station at Raumati** is aimed at reducing road congestion in Paraparaumu
- **The Kapiti Western Link Road** connecting Te Moana Road, Waikanae, with Paraparaumu. The objective of this component of the plan is to significantly reduce state highway flows, and provide an alternative Waikanae crossing.
- **The Lindale Transportation Hub** has the objective of reducing traffic volumes through the congested SH1/Kapiti Road intersection, and encouraging use of the Kapiti Western Link Road.

- **Lindale Station** would provide additional park and ride capacity, providing relief for Paraparaumu, and improve the service for current Paraparaumu Station users originating north of Paraparaumu
- **Upgrade SH1** to a four-lane expressway estimated to be completed in 2025. This would provide an efficient and reliable highway along the Kapiti Coast in the long term

CENTRAL SECTION

The improvements to the central section consist of changes to passenger transport and a series of road improvements. Key components for passenger transport include:

- **Upgrading the Porirua bus/rail interchange** and creating a **better linkage to the Porirua Central Business District** would increase rail patronage and therefore reduce congestion in the southern part of the corridor.
- **Increasing peak period train frequency** from 20 to 15 minutes and **increasing the number of rail cars** on the Kapiti/Paraparaumu line would increase the capacity
- **Double tracking the single track sections** through the rail tunnels north of Pukerua Bay would improve longer term reliability

Key road improvements include:


- **TGM geotechnical investigation.** This would allow a better understanding of the risks involved in building this route, and therefore reduce the amount of uncertainty over costs.
- Construction of **Paekakariki and Whitford Brown Interchanges** would improve access and safety at these intersections
- **A Coastal Expressway** consisting of a four-lane median divided highway between MacKays crossing and Tawa, including Pukerua Bay and Mana bypasses, would improve capacity
- **Grays Road upgrade** would improve the existing road and bypass the Camborne and Pauatahanui communities
- **Double tracking between Pukerua Bay and Paekakariki** would improve reliability and allow an increase in rail frequency during peak periods

SOUTHERN SECTION

Key proposed improvements in the Southern section include:

- **A Petone-Grenada Link Road** which would provide a shorter alternative for traffic travelling from Grenada to Petone (approximately 27 percent of the traffic currently using the Ngauranga Gorge). This would reduce traffic volumes in the most congested part of the corridor.
- **Investigation into High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes along Ngauranga Gorge.** Introduction of HOV lanes may be necessary to discourage vehicles currently using Burma Road from diverting to the less congested Ngauranga Gorge. This will maintain the benefits derived from the Petone-Grenada Link Road.

Figure 3: Map from Consultation Document



Annex 2: The Statutory Context

Land Transport Management Act

The Land Transport Management Act 2003 (the Act) was enacted in November 2003. The Act significantly changes the funding and management of land transport to contribute to the aim of achieving an integrated, safe, responsive, and sustainable land transport system. The objectives of the Land Transport Management Act 2003 are to:

- assist economic development
- assist safety and personal security
- improve access and mobility
- protect and promote public health
- ensure environmental sustainability.

Together the New Zealand Transport Strategy and the Land Transport Management Act 2003 reflect a multi-modal, integrated, approach to land transport. The Act's purpose is set out in section 3(1) of the Act. Subsection (2) of that section states:

"(2) To contribute to that purpose, this Act –

(a) provides an integrated approach to land transport funding and management; and

(b) improves social and environmental responsibility in land transport funding, planning, and management; and

(c) changes the statutory objectives of Transfund and Transit to broaden the focus of each entity; and

(d) improves long term planning and investment in land transport; and

(e) ensures that land transport funding is allocated in an efficient and effective manner; and

(f) improves the flexibility of land transport funding, including provisions enabling new roads to be built on a tolled or concession agreement basis or on a basis involving a combination of those methods".

S.12 of the Land Transport Management Act sets out the requirements for preparation of Land Transport Programmes:

Land Transport Programmes–

(1) In each financial year, every approved organisation that recommends that any activities or activity classes be included in a national Land Transport Programme must, by a date or dates appointed by the Authority, –

(a) prepare a Land Transport Programme for the next financial year; and

(b) forward copies to the Authority, Transit, the Commissioner, and the Secretary; and

(c) make it available to the public in a written form

(2) The provisions of Part 1 of Schedule 1 (which relate to the content of Land Transport Programmes) apply to Land Transport Programmes and organisations preparing them.

- (3) *An approved organisation must, in preparing a Land Transport Programme, take into account how each activity or activity class –*
- (a) assists economic development; and*
 - (b) assists safety and personal security; and*
 - (c) improves access and mobility; and*
 - (d) protects and promotes public health; and*
 - (e) ensures environmental sustainability.*
- (4) *Repealed.*
- (5) *An approved organisation (other than ARTA) must, in preparing a Land Transport Programme, take into account any current national land transport strategy, National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy, and relevant Regional land transport strategies.*
- (6) *ARTA must, in preparing a Land Transport Programme,–*
- (a) take into account any current national land transport strategy and the National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy:*
 - (b) from a date appointed by the Governor-General by Order in Council, give effect to the matters in the Auckland Regional land transport strategy required by S.175(2) of the Land Transport Act 1998, unless it is required to do otherwise by operational considerations that affect the sequencing and timing of activities, the funding available to it, or its statutory functions or powers.*

Land Transport Act 1998

The Land Transport Management Act 2003 also amended the Local Government Act 1974, the Transit New Zealand Act 1989, and the Land Transport Act 1998 (which contains the provisions relating to Regional Land Transport Strategies. The new S.175(2) of the Land Transport Act 1998 requires that:

- “(2) Every Regional land transport strategy must –*
- (a) contribute to the overall aim of achieving an integrated, safe, responsive and sustainable land transport system; and*
 - (b) take into account how the strategy –*
 - (i) assists economic development; and*
 - (ii) assists safety and personal security; and*
 - (iii) improves access and mobility; and*
 - (iv) protects and promotes public health; and*
 - (v) ensures environmental sustainability; and*
 - (c) take into account any national land transport strategy and National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy; and*
 - (d) take into account the land transport funding likely to be available within the Region during the period covered by the strategy; and*
 - (e) avoid, to the extent reasonable in the circumstances, adverse effects on the environment; and*
 - (f) take into account the views of affected communities; and*
 - (g) take into account the views of land transport network providers; and*
 - (h) take into account the need for persons and organisations preparing Regional land transport strategies to give early and full consideration to land transport options and alternatives in a way that contributes to the objectives referred to in paragraphs (e) and (f) when preparing a Regional land transport strategy; and*

- (i) take into account the need to encourage persons and organisations preparing Regional land transport strategies to provide early and full opportunities for persons and organisations listed in section 179(1) to contribute to the development of those Regional land transport strategies; and*
- (j) identify an appropriate role for each land transport mode in the Region, including freight traffic, public passenger transport, cycling, and pedestrian traffic; and*
- (k) include any Regional passenger transport plan (within the meaning of section 47 of the Transport Services Licensing Act 1989) that has been prepared by the Regional council that has prepared the strategy; and*
- (l) identify land transport outcomes sought by the Region and the strategic options for achieving those outcomes; and*
- (m) identify any strategic options for which cooperation is required with other Regions; and*
- (n) identify persons or organisations who should be involved in the further development of strategic options; and*
- (o) include a demand management strategy that has targets and timetables appropriate for the Region; and*
- (p) provide for the strategy to be independently audited; and*
- (q) take into account any guidelines issued by the Minister for the purposes of this section."*

Annex 3: Additional Funding for Wellington

Relevant extract from Land Transport NZ Performance Agreement

"This section states the way in which the government wishes to see the additional Crown contributions invested in Wellington transport infrastructure and services.

- \$65m (GST exclusive) (between 2005/06 and 2014/15) is intended for investment in infrastructure and services (primarily rail) to maintain passenger transport mode share. This can be used to assist Greater Wellington Regional Council (GWRC) meet its share of the costs on the condition that GWRC has agreed to raise additional rates revenue estimated to be \$95m over ten years;*
- \$160m (GST exclusive) (between 2005/06 and 2014/15) is intended for investment in strategic roading, transport demand management and enhanced passenger transport to reduce congestion and improve access. Land Transport New Zealand can use some of this amount to contribute to a local authority's share of costs for relevant projects from this additional Crown contribution;*
- \$255m (GST exclusive) (between 2007/08 and 2015/16) is intended as additional Crown investment in passenger transport and roading to address congestion, improve safety and improve access reliability on the Western Corridor;*
- \$405m (GST exclusive) (between 2007/08 and 2015/16) is intended for State highway construction to advance a long term solution to address access reliability for State Highway 1 between Wellington and Kapiti."*

Annex 4: The Hearings Sub-committee's Brief and Process

The Sub-committee's Terms of Reference as adopted by RLTC on 6 October 2005 listed the subcommittee's powers as to:

1. Approve the documentation and communications strategy;
2. Hear oral submissions on the WCP;
3. Consider both the written and oral submissions on the WCP;
4. Summarise the outcomes of the consultation process;
5. Seek clarification from the study team or any other appropriate people on any technical matters;
6. Receive the results of the wider Regional community survey;
7. Receive the approved Consenting Strategy;
8. Receive information from the Transit New Zealand Board in relation to State Highway components of the Corridor plan;
9. Conduct a preliminary review of all cultural, economic, environmental, social, costing and technical information and the results of the Consenting Strategy for the Coastal Route;
10. Prepare a report of its findings for the Regional Land Transport Committee and Transit New Zealand with conclusions regarding a WCP.

And its responsibilities as ensuring that:

1. The documentation and communications strategy accurately, fairly and impartially reflects the technical information used in the development of the Proposed WCP and the decisions of the RLTC;
2. The hearing and consideration process is carried out in a way that is effective and timely;
3. Submitters are provided with the best possible opportunity to be heard in support of their submission;
4. The process is robust and transparent and the summary of the consultation process accurately, fairly and demonstrably reflects the submitters' comments;
5. They take into account the requirements of S.175 of the Land Transport Act 1998 and the Land Transport Management Act 2003, all cultural, economic, environmental, social, costing and technical information, a Consenting Strategy for the route, the results of the wider Regional survey and the outcome of the consultation process.

Documentation and Communications Strategy

Of necessity, the documentation and communications strategy was developed, approved and published by 1 October 2005, prior to the formation of this Sub-committee.

Hearings Process

The Sub-committee was immediately faced with the task of providing for 904 submitters wishing to be heard but "in an effective and timely manner". Approvers were contacted and provided with an indicative time and an opportunity to rearrange this time. While most

appearers were individuals or households some were industry or community organisations or affected stakeholders – these were assigned a longer appearance time. Neutral venues were arranged in 3 different locations to cater for the wide geographical range of submitters. Some evening sessions were provided to assist full-time workers. Appearers wishing to be rescheduled were given several later choices. As hearings proceeded and a pattern of “no-shows” appeared, scheduled appearers were contacted beforehand for confirmation of appearance or further rescheduling. The Sub-committee records its appreciation of the work undertaken by Core Communications in arranging all this and in providing both to the panel and to interested submitters or observers continuously updated schedules of appearances.

Hearings were held over 28 sitting days, from 24 November to 16 December and a further period from 24 January to 14 February. 394 submitters appeared before the Sub-committee. Several submitters were asked to reappear. Many submitters represented community groups, organisations, or wider family interests. There were also several multiple signature submissions, including one with 5443 signatories.

The Sub-committee cannot guarantee that every would-be appearer has actually appeared but can record its understanding that every person who wished to appear was given more than one opportunity to do so “in an effective and timely manner”.

Considering oral and written submissions

All 5 Sub-committee members read the 5993 submissions received before Christmas. A further 24 late submissions were read later. All 5 members re-read the written submissions of appearers prior to their appearance. Submission analysis by both Core (as reported below) and Sub-committee members identified significant matters amongst the submitters who did not request appearance and included these in considerations.

Appearers frequently produced supplementary material at their appearance; often this was weighty material in its own right, indeed some findings and conclusions are based on such material. As pertinent material this was also considered by all 5 panel members, and a separate record of this material is compiled, organised in submitter number order.

Reading and considering this volume of material was a large task in its own right, undertaken iteratively by members beginning in November, carrying through the Christmas break, and culminating in a rush of material in the last week of hearings.

Collective consideration took place throughout, on half-days extra to the hearings reserved for this purpose, during break-outs or down-times on sitting days, and in a more concentrated form immediately after the hearings concluded.

Summarising the outcomes of consultation

The Sub-committee’s summary is embedded elsewhere in this report, especially section (4). Core Communications assisted the Sub-committee by preparing a separate report and statistical summary of written submissions.

Seeking clarification and further information

During hearings and considerations, the subcommittee requested various other material that was deemed pertinent and already available amongst the many reports and studies around these issues. A list of this extra material appears below.

While the Sub-committee’s powers could be interpreted as authorising further time-consuming and expensive studies before deliberations, the Sub-committee felt this was neither necessary nor useful. The Sub-committee did request some submitters to follow up their interesting first submissions with extra work if they wished, but commissioned only the one piece, an independent legal opinion on a limited range of particular matters.

DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED BY HEARINGS SUB-COMMITTEE

A. Material Specific to this process

- Core Communications
 - Submissions on Proposed Plan (18 volumes), Nov 2005*
- Core Communications
 - Record of Appearances at Western Corridor Hearings, Feb 2006*
- Core Communications
 - Supplementary Material from Western Corridor Hearings Appearances (4 volumes), Feb 2006*
- DMB Research
 - Western Corridor Plan: Public Opinion Survey, Feb 2006*
- Joint Officials Group
 - Report on Wellington Transport Package, July 2005*
- Greater Wellington/Transit Western Corridor Study Team
 - Consultation and Technical Reports (2 volumes), Oct 2005*
- Greater Wellington/Transit Western Corridor Study Team
 - Consultation Document, Oct 2005*
- Transit
 - Consenting Strategy for Coastal Route, Feb 2006*
- Treasury
 - Clarification of Western Corridor Project Costings, Feb 2006*

B. Additional Material Requested by the Subcommittee

- Brown, Copeland and Company
 - Additional Economic Benefits from the Transmission Gully Project, March 2004*
- Beca Carter
 - Transmission Gully - Route Security Benefits, June 2004*
- Beca Carter
 - Petone Grenada Link Study, March 1995*
- Beca/Parsons Brinkerhoff
 - Pukerua Bay- Paekakariki Rail Tunnel Feasibility Report, March 2005*
- Brennand and Bollard
 - Reconciling Traffic Modelling, Feb 2006*
- Booz Allen
 - Impacts of Petone Grenada Link, Feb 2006*
- Environment Court Decision 52/2001
 - PCC, Middleton and Others v Transit, 2001*
- GWRC
 - Hutt Corridor Study (3 volumes), 2002*
- GWRC
 - Draft Regional Passenger Transport Plan, Dec 2005*
- McDermott Miller
 - Willingness to Pay Survey (2 volumes), 1999*
- Rush Consulting
 - Social and Environmental Impact Assessment, TG v CR, 2004*

Te Runanga o Ngati Toa Rangatira
Western Corridor Cultural Impact Report, 2005

Transmission Gully Action Group
Results of Opinion Survey, 2005

Transfund (now Land Transport NZ)
Project Evaluation Manual, Current

In respect of seeking clarification from the Study Team, the Sub-committee met with the Study Team four times during the hearings, at the beginning and end, and twice during the hearings. All appearances are recorded in the Record of Proceedings.

Receiving surveys and Consenting Strategy

The Sub-committee received the public opinion survey during the last week of hearings. Prior to its appearance the subcommittee had requested and received copies of two other surveys – the 1999 GW/Transit Willingness to pay (tolls) survey, and the 2005 TGM Action Group survey. It is the Sub-committee's view that all three surveys reinforce each other in their main findings, and further that the summary of submissions of this exercise further underlines the same findings. Of course submissions represent a self-selected population, as people who are neutral, indifferent, unsure or unaware of the issue are not represented amongst submitters but will be represented in surveys.

The Sub-committee received the Consenting Strategy during the last week of hearings, and discusses this in section 4 of the report.

The Sub-committee received the Treasury review of cost estimates.

Receiving information from the Transit Board

The Sub-committee received advice from the Transit Board in respect of the Consenting Strategy. The Sub-committee has checked with the Chief Executive of Transit after the hearings concluded as to whether there was any further information the Board wished us to take into account and received the advice that there was none.

Conducting a preliminary review of information

The balance of the Sub-committee Report addresses this task. The Sub-committee noted that the sum of its requests for further information and reports as listed above covered each and all of the aspects required.

Report findings and conclusions

The balance of this Sub-committee Report includes findings and conclusions.

Annex 5: Sub-committee Members

Terry McDavitt

Chair

Chair of the Regional Land Transport Committee

Terry McDavitt has been Chair of Wellington Regional Land Transport Committee since 1992. First elected to the Regional Council in 1989, he was also Chair of Passenger Transport until 2001, and since 2001 has been Deputy Chair of Regional Council.

A Wellington City Councillor 1983-92, where he was chair of Traffic and Transport and Town Planning Commissioner, he is a political representative on Local Government New Zealand's transport reference group, and the local government representative on some central government transport reference groups.

Terry is qualified policy analyst and resource consent commissioner, and specialises in hearings where traffic, transport or coastal issues are significant. He is a JP, and has interests in market research and a retail business in Wellington city.

Alan Bickers

Public and private sector consultant, appointed by Transit New Zealand

Alan is a Tauranga-based Civil Engineer and Management Consultant who provides strategic advice on implementation of major infrastructure projects, including contractual arrangements, procurement strategies and risk management.

He is an accredited independent Commissioner to local authorities and the Minister of Conservation under the Resource Management Act. He also acts as a Commissioner under the Land Transport Management Act and Reserves Act.

Alan was a member of the Board of Transit New Zealand from April 1997 until January 2004 and was Chairman for the latter half of that period.

Sir Brian Elwood CBE **Former Chief Ombudsman**

Barrister and Solicitor. Sir Brian is Former Chief Ombudsman, and President of the International Ombudsman Institute. Sir Brian has previously been Chairman of the Local Government Commission, Commissioner of the Wellington Hospital Board, Mayor of Palmerston North and a Member of the Wellington Harbour Board.

He is currently Chairman of the Board of Kiwifruit New Zealand.

Charles Finny

CEO Wellington Regional Chamber of Commerce

Charles Finny has been CEO of the Wellington Regional Chamber of Commerce since February 2005. Prior to joining the Chamber he had 22 years experience in international trade, economics, negotiation and diplomacy. His particular areas of expertise are China, Asia generally, and international trade law. He headed the New Zealand Commerce and Industry Office in Taipei from 2001 to 2004; the Government's China FTA Task Force through 2004; and had previously served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the New Zealand Embassy in Beijing, and First secretary at the New Zealand High Commission in

Singapore. Charles helped negotiate several generations of the CER agreements with Australia and the New Zealand Singapore Closer Economic Partnership. He also has considerable expertise in WTO and APEC affairs. Charles Chaired the APEC Budget and Management Committee in 2000 and was the Trade Policy Adviser to the APEC Chair in 1999. In the early part of his career Charles worked for the Department of Trade and Industry and the Prime Minister's Department. Charles has been an active member of the Greater Wellington Regional Council's Regional Land Transport Committee since early 2005 when he was appointed an alternate member representing the interests of economic development. He became a full member of the Committee in December 2005.


Kay Saville-Smith

Sociologist, CRESA Ltd

Kay Saville-Smith (MA(Hons), DipJ) is a sociologist with a policy background in housing, mental health and the health of women, children, young people. She undertakes research related to local and Regional infrastructure including: development planning for the greenfields development at Flatbush; neighbourhood sustainability research; the HEEP study; the Healthy Housing Study ; labour and housing market adjustment in the Nelson, Marlborough and Tasman areas to resolve constraints on economic production and growth; and the evaluation of the Rural Housing Programme. She has extensive experience in the social impacts of resource use and access in rural and urban settings. She also leads a six-year study on residential movement and community attachment funded by the Foundation for Research Science and Technology. She is a member of the Warm Homes Advisory Committee for the Ministry for the Environment and a member of the Ministerial Advisory Group on Social Science.

Annex 6: Lifelines Map

Figure 4: Lifelines Map



Source: David Brunson, Presentation to the Sub-committee, Tuesday 7 February 2006.